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Ten years having passed since the enactment of the Public Utility
Holding Company Act,' some of its more important aspects may appropriately be reviewed to see how it has functioned and, if possible,
the direction in which its administration by the Securities and Exchange Commission is leading.
The enormous volume of work already accomplished under this
statute forbids a comprehensive review here. 2 Faced with a problem
of selection we have focused our attention in these pages upon corporate readjustments which, though affected by numerous provisions
of the Act, have evolved primarily out of the requirements of Section I I.
It may be recalled that Section II was the focal point of conflict
when the legislation was before Congress in 1935. In its original
form opponents called the proposal a "death sentence" in tones that
struck terror into the soul of many an investor. As enacted, financial
reporters and commentators have called it that on occasion, but the
tone is not the same; what began as a sensational battlecry has become
a mere nickname for a section number. As we shall show, there is
a growing realization that a "death sentence" imposed upon a disembodied legal fiction can mean, and has repeatedly meant, a new lease
on life for the flesh-and-blood investor.
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I.

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES

To understand the full import of Section II it is necessary to
have some familiarity with the general 'objectives and historical background of the Act. Generally speaking, it is the policy of the Act to
"meet the problems and eliminate the evils" specified in Section I (b)
connected with "holding companies" (which are, in brief, companies
that hold voting securities of gas and electric utility companies in sufficient quantity to control the latter) 3 engaged in interstate commerce
or in activities which directly affect or burden interstate commerce;
and for that purpose to compel, among other things, the "simplification" of holding-company systems. 4 The meaning of the term "simplification" and the manner of its accomplishment constitute the substance
of our discussion.
There are holding companies in many fields of enterprise, some
doubtless good, some bad. We are not concerned with the question
whether it is theoretically good or bad to let one corporation control
another. The Act deals with holding-company problems only in the
gas and electric utility field, and these problems grew out of the manner in which control was in fact exercised and held. The legislation
had to deal with an existing situation, not a theory.
The kind of holding company with which we are concerned began
to be recognized as a national problem in the 1920S. Originally, gas
and electric utilities were typically local, not only as to operations but
also as to ownership and control. They were run by men who were
expected to know about producing and distributing gas and electricity.
Their financial policies were pretty generally geared to those services.
On the ground that economy of service would be thereby promoted,
these local companies tended to acquire exclusive operating rights and
thus to become monopolies in the areas they served. Though subjected early to rate regulation they were often, as now, highly profitable,
and they became natural prey to high-powered speculators who possessed, in the aggregate, an amazing line of manipulative schemes.
The holding-company entrepreneur of the 1920S is caricatured in a
passage from one of Sinclair's novels:
3. The term "holding company" is elaborately defined in Section 2 (a) (7), 49
STAT. 8o6 (i935), 15 U. S. C. § 79b (a) (7) (ig4i), of the Act, but the full definition
is immaterial for present purposes. The controlled companies are "subsidiary com-

panies," which may include non-utilities and subholding companies as well as "utility
companies." Section 2 (a) (8), 49 STAT. 8O7 (935), i5 U. S. C. § 79b (a) (8)
(194). The term "utility company" as used in the Act and in this article is limited to
companies owning or operating facilities for the distribution of gas at retail or for the
generation, transmission, or distribution of electric energy. Sections 2 (a) (3) and
2 (a) (4), 49 STAT. 804, 805 (i935), 15 U. S. C. §79b (a) (3,4) (94).
4. Section i (c) of the Act, 49 STAT. 8o4 (i935), i5 U. S. C. § 79a (c) (194').

150

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

"J. Paramount Barnes had begun life as a broker's messenger
boy, and had learned all the tricks and invented many new ones.
He had organized a utilities holding company, and had been so
successful that he had repeated the stunt again and again, until he
had a holding company for holding companies, a colossal pyramid
with himself sitting on the top, and so many subsidiaries and investment trusts and stock-issuing and dividend-receiving devices
that it was to be doubted if any human brain knew the whole of
that tangle of complications."
The author, with a fantasy not unfounded in fact, has his "tycoon"
controlling the top company
by three 'voting shares,' having a par value of one dollar
each; which meant that the colossal enterprise would rest permanently in the capable hands of J. Paramount Barnes, his personal
secretary, and one of his office clerks. The concern would proceed
to issue several hundred million dollars in common shares, give
part of them to Mr. J. Paramount Bdrnes for his services, and sell
the rest to the public. In their present mood millions of the plain
people all over-the country would rush to buy the shares of any
concern about which they read in the papers, and they would
start bidding up the price on the exchange so that everybody
would be rich and continuing to grow richer every day." 5
We have no statistics on how many holding-company magnates
began as brokers' messenger boys, but not a few were primarily financiers, paper-minded rather than operational in their approach to utility
system problems. Some of these, possessing or commanding prime
financial and legal talent, bent their efforts to the accumulation of voting control over existing utilities and other enterprises, deprived them
of all semblance of independence, and smothered them under elaborate
paper superstructures. 6 The operating utilities and other businesses at
the base of these pyramids furnished all the revenues derived from
outside sources, and a large percentage of revenues were drained' off,
in numerous instances, by exorbitant service and construction fees'
charged against them by "service companies" belonging to the parent
holding company or to the individual interests who controlled the
system. 7 What was left of the earnings after expenses, fixed charges,
Two WORLDS (941) 662-3.
6. See Healy, Organizationof Private Electric and Gas Utilities, 5 TRANSACONS
THE THiRD WORLD Powrx CONFERENCE (1936) 288.
5. SINCLAIR, BETWEEN

OF

7.The functions of system-owned and affiliated "service companies" varied widely.
Some furnished engineering advice and construction work, some furnished bookkeeping or auditing services, some performed outright every managerial function that an
operating company's officers and board of directors could have performed. Whatever
they did,' the purpose of many of them was to obtain fees (including profits often*running to ioo% or more) which would be treated as operating expenses or capital costs
in the accounts of the paying utilities, but would be received as income by the con-
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and preferred stock dividend requirements of the operating companies,
had to percolate upward through tier upon tier of holding companies
to pay the interest and dividends on their outstanding securities. In
such systems the companies in the superstructure were used for the
purpose of retaining the insiders' control while the financial investment
and risk were passed on to public investors by the flotation of a myriad
of holding-company securities carrying no effective power to control
the management. The securities issued to the public were frequently
based on inflated "book value" bearing little or no relation to the
amounts actually invested in the revenue-producing properties at the
base of the pyramid, and were issued on the most optimistic assumptions as to the earning power of such properties.8
Of course, there were holding-company systems created and managed in a much more conservative manner than those we have described. Some that were left in the hands of sound operating men
presented a strikingly different picture, and gave rise to few of the
problems that required curative legislation. But the conservative manager had an uphill fight to hold his own against the entrepreneur who
was conducting raids on soundly built establishments and paying fantastic prices for voting control. If he did not sell out he was apt to
be submerged in an unequal battle. Sometimes his only chance for
survival was to resort to devices for the maintenance of control similar
trolling persons. Since the companies paying the fees were under the control of the
very persons who profited from the fees, the system-owned or affiliated service company was in a position to render "services" (whether they were needed or not) at
prices which were not limited by competitive conditions or even by the independent
business judgment of the paying company's officers. See, e. g., Pennsylvania Power
& Light Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 139 F. (2d) 445 (C. C. A. 3d, 1943), cert.
denied, 321 U. S. 798 (I944).
These fees, which were passed on to the consumer in the electric and gas rates
charged by the utilities, were not subject to ready analysis by state or local regulatory
bodies, which usually did not have jurisdiction over the service companies or their
records. New Hampshire Gas & Electric Co. v. Morse, 42 F. (2d) 490 (D. N. H.
193o); It re Utilities Power & Light Corp., P. U. R. 193oB 359 (Mo. P. S. C.
1930) ; Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F. (2d) 139 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931). See
JONES & BIGHAM, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILM ES (1932) 605-6, 616. But cf.

Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 282 U. S. 133 (1930); Dayton Power & Light
Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, 292 U. S. 290 (1934). The problems thus
raised went a long way toward explaining the need for federal legislation.
Under the Act, system-owned service companies are expressly prohibited from
charging more than cost and are closely regulated as to the determination and fair
allocation of cost among the companies served. Affiliated and independent service companies are also subject to regulation and federal examination. See Section 13 (b) to
(f), 49 STAT. 825-7 (1935), 15 U. S. C. § 79m (b-f) (194). For an interesting discussion of these problems see Eicher, Progressin Service Company Regulation (1941)
27 P. U. FORT. 707; Consumers and the Public Utility Holding Company Act (I941)
21 J. Bus. U. OF IOWA 4.
S. One common reason for the overstatement of earnings was failure to provide
adequately for the replacement of worn-out or obsolete properties. Federal Trade Commission, Utility Corporations,SEN. Doc. No. 92, 7oth Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) pt. 72-A,
515, 849-851, 869-870. See also Report of Public Utilities Division, Securities and Exchange Commission, Depreciation and Dividend Statistics of Electric and Gas Utilitv
Subsidiaries of Registered Holding Companies, T930-z940 (1942).
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to those used by the raiders themselves-with results that were only
slightly less unfortunate for public investors following the crash of
1929.

The methods by which the holding-company structures were created, and the various means by which an enthusiastic public was induced to put its savings and its faith in even the most flimsy of them,
make a very long story indeed which required years of expert inquiry
to develop. The dangers inherent in the shift from local control were
publicly recognized long before disaster called a halt. As early as
December, 1924, the United States Senate expressed concern over the
existence of undue concentration of control over the electric power
industry and the financial connections of that industry. 9 In 19:25 it
ordered an investigation of a limited phase of the problem,1 but this
resulted in no immediate legislation. The need for action to protect
the public interest grew more acute and, in February, 1928, the Senate
adopted a resolution directing the Federal Trade Commission to make
a thorough investigation of interstate utility corporations, their holding
companies, associates and affiliates, and to report the results of its
1
studies to the Senate.
In obedience to this resolution the Trade Commission started an
inquiry that took several years to complete and a great many printed
volumes to report. 12 For this project it secured the services of Robert
E. Healy, a Vermont Republican formerly a judge of the Supreme
Court of that State, who accepted the duties of Chief Counsel and at
the outset made it plain that the investigation was to be an impartial
and objective inquiry into the facts. Material obtained by the Trade
Commission's investigators, largely documentary, was presented at
open hearings at which industry representatives were afforded the
fullest opportunity to cross-examine, rebut, and explain. The report
represents "the most thoroughgoing investigation of an American industry that has ever appeared." 1 Other studies, also of great interest and only less monumental, were made under Congressional and
executive direction before the Holding Company Act was finally
adopted.' 4
9.See SEN. REs. No. 286, 68th Cong., 2d Sess. (1925).
io. SEN. REs. No. 329, 68th Cong., 2d Sess. (1925).
ii. SEN. REs. No. 83, 70th Cong., Ist Sess. (1928).
12. Federal Trade Commission, Utility Corporations, SEN. Doc. No. 92, 70th Cong.,
ist Sess. (1935) submitted in iox volumes. The study was substantially finished by
1935, but additional parts continued to be reported from time to time until 1937.
13. BAgrrEs, THE ECONOmiCS OF PuBLIc UTILITY REGULATION (1942) 71.
14. Report on Relation of Holding Companies to Operating Companies in Power
and Gas Affecting Control ("Splawn Report") (6 Vols.), H. R. REP. No. 827, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1933-5) ; Report of National Power Policy Committee, H. R. Doc.
No. 137, 74th Cong., ist Sess. (1935) ; hearings and reports of the Congressional committees on H. R. 5423 and S. 2796, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
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It will be noted that although the legislation was placed on the
statute books in 1935 under New Deal impetus, much of the spadework had been done under Republican leadership. The Act may thus
be said to be a result of bipartisan effort. The business depression of
the early I93OS had already demonstrated the financial instability of
the paper pyramids, and by 1935 the need for federal regulation was
widely recognized in Congress. 15
II. STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND PROCEDURES
Among the statutory provisions that had been generally accepted
in the early stages of the legislation were these: all holding companies
(except certain intrastate, temporary and other companies exempted
under Section 3 [a] ) were required to become "registered" and to file
in the public files of the Commission statements containing descriptive
historical and financial data regarding themselves and each of their
subsidiary companies (Sections 4 and 5), and to keep such information up to date by the filing of periodical and special reports (Section
14); the issue and sale of securities by registered holding companies
and their subsidiaries were subjected to statutory standards embracing
analysis and clearance by the Commission (Sections 6 and 7), as were
acquisitions and sales of utility properties and securities and the declaration and payment of dividends (Sections 9, 10, 12 [c], 12 [d]);
"upstream" loans, i.e. loans by subsidiaries to their parents, were prohibited and other intrasystem loans regulated (Sections 12 [a],
12 [b]) ; a wide variety of transactions with affiliates were subjected
to scrutiny and veto by the Commission (Sections

12

[f],

12 [g]);

performance of services by holding companies was prohibited, system
service charges were limited to cost, and service contracts and service
companies were made subject to the Commission's regulation (Section
13, and see note 7 supra) ; authority to prescribe accounting systems
and cost-accounting procedures was given to the Commission, subject
to any applicable requirements of state commissions and other regulatory bodies having jurisdiction (Sections 15, 20); bankers' representatives were in general disqualified from acting as directors or officers of registered holding companies and subsidiaries (Section 17 [c]) ;
and the Commission was given the necessary powers to enforce and
I5. See 79 CONG. REC. 9o42, 9o63-4 (1935). According to a compilation made by
members of the Commission's staff, between September I, 1929 and July I, 1935, fiftytwo holding companies, having about $1,5oo,ooo,ooo of outstanding securities (exclusive of securities held by affiliates), and thirty-six utility subsidiaries, having approximately $355,000,000 of such securities, went into receivership or bankruptcy. During
the same period, twenty-three holding companies, having about $535,ooo,ooo of such
securities, and sixteen utility subsidiaries, having approximately $152,ooo,ooo of such
securities, offered debt readjustment or extension plans following defaults in payment
of interest.
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carry out the Act by rules and regulations, by applications to the District Courts, and by orders (subject to direct review in the United
States Courts of Appeals for the various Circuits and the District of
Columbia) (Sections i8,20, 24).16
The only important conflict arose over a proposal to strike at the
root of the holding-company problem by providing for the virtual
elimination of holding companies from the utility field, and for close
regulation of those that were permitted to remain. The Senate backed
this proposal, but the House, while agreeing that close regulation was
necessary, opposed the elimination of holding companies and provided only in general terms for administrative authority to limit the
number of utility systems that could be controlled by any one holding17
Section ii as
company system. The result was a compromise.
finally adopted represented a significant victory for both consumer and
investor interests. It furnishes a healthy impetus toward a return
of utilities to local operational management and simplified conservative
security structures; and it provides relief for ailing corporate structures through reorganization machinery not available under pre-existing law.
A return to localized management is promoted by Section i i (b)
(i) of the Act-the provision for geographical and operational "integration"; and impetus toward simplified and conservative security
structures is furnished principally, though not exclusively, by Section
ii (b) (2). These provide in substance that it shall be the duty of
the Commission, as -oon as practicable after January I, 1938, to require by order, after notice and opportunity for hearing, that each
registered holding"company and each subsidiary thereof:
(i) shall take such action as the Commission finds necessary
to limit the operations of the "holding-company system" to one or
more "integrated public-utility systems" operating in the same
general area or region,' and to such related "other businesses" as
are permitted by standards set forth in this section; and
16. Most of the regulatory provisions apply only to "registered" holding companies. After the Act was passed few holding companies registered until extensive liti-

gation over the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 5 was terminated by the Supreme
Court's decision in Electric Bond and Share Co. v. SEC, 303 U. S. 419 (1938).
17. Cf. S. 2796, 74th Cong., ist Sess., as passed by the Senate on June 1I, 1935,
79 CONG. REc. 9040-9065 (I935), with that bill as passed by the House on July 2, 1935,
79 CONG. REc. IO634-IO642. The House bill made no provision for compulsory corporate readjustments. The two versions of the bill were sent to conference and the
disagreements were resolved. See Conference Report, H. R. EP. No. 1903, 74th Cong.,
Ist Sess. (i935).
18. A "holding-company system" consists of any holding company together with
its subsidiaries. Section 2 (a) (9), 49 STAT. 808 (935), 15 U. S. C. § 79b (a) (9)
(1941). An "integrated public-utility system" consists of physical utility properties
meeting certain prescribed standards as to interconnection and coordination, "confined
in its operations to a single area or region, in one or more States, not so large as to impair (considering the state of the art and the area or region affected) the advantages
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(2)
shall take such steps as the Commission finds necessary
"to ensure that the corporate structure or continued existence of
any company in the holding-company system does not unduly or
unnecessarily complicate the structure" of such system, or "unfairly or inequitably distribute voting power among the security
holders" thereof. The Commission must not permit more than
two tiers of
holding companies to continue over any public-utility
9

company.3

The machinery most frequently employed by solvent companies
for effectuating the necessary structural changes is contained in Section i i (e), which provides for the submission of plans formulated by
the companies' own managements. To become effective the plan must
be approved by the Commission, after notice and opportunity for hearing, on the basis of the Commission's finding that the plan (as submitted or as modified) is "necessary to effectuate the provisions of"
Section Ii(b), and is "fair and equitable to the persons affected by
such plan." At the request of the company the Commission may apply
to an appropriate United States District Court to enforce and carry
20
out the terms of a plan theretofore approved by the Commission.

If

the court approves the plan as "fair and equitable" and as "appropriate to effectuate the provisions of Section i i," it may take exclusive
jurisdiction and possession of the company and its assets, and may
appoint a trustee to administer the assets under the direction of the
21
court and in accordance with the plan.
of localized management, efficient operation, and the effectiveness of regulation: Pro-

vided, That gas utility companies deriving natural gas from a common source of supply may be deemed to be included in a single area or region." Section 2 (a) (29), 49
STAT. 81o (1935), 15 U. S. C. § 79b (a) (29) (1941).
ig.No change may be required as to the corporate structure or continued existence of any system company which is not a holding company or which is primarily a
public-utility company, except for the purpose of "fairly and equitably distributing
voting power among the security holders of such company." Questions as to the meaning and constitutionality of Section ii have been raised in a number of cases which
are now pending in the United States Supreme Court. North American Co. v. SEC,
133 F. (2d) 148 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943), appeal pending, 320 U. S. 708 (1943) ; Engineers
Public Service Co. v. SEC, 138 F. (2d) 936 (App. D. C. 1943), cert. granted, 332
U. S. 723 (I944) ; American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, Electric Power & Light Co.
v. SEC, 141 F. (2d) 6o6 (C. C. A. ist, I944), cert. granted, 324 U. S. 835 (1945).
2o. Where proceedings for enforcement of a plan are instituted in the District
Court, that court gets exclusive jurisdiction over all questions involved in the plan
and its enforcement, and no direct appeal from the Commission's order on such questions lies to a Circuit Court of Appeals. Okn v. SEC, 145 F. (2d) 206 (C. C. A. 2d,
1944), remanded in part, 324 U. S. 835 (1945). And it has been held that where a
plan contemplates enforcement in the District Court no direct appeal from the Commission's order lies to a Circuit Court of Appeals, even though the enforcement proceedings have not yet been instituted at the time of the filing of the appeal. Lownsbury v.
SEC, 15I F. (2d) 217 (C. C. A. 3d, 1945), rehearing denied, October 2, 1945.
2i. Section ii (d), 49 STAT. 821 (I935), 15 U. S. C. § 79k (d)
(194i), makes
provision for the formulation of plans by the Commission or other persons and for
court enforcement of such plans without the request or consent of the holding company or subsidiary company concerned. But the Commission has always favored the
development of plans by company managements and has afforded them every opportunity to work out their own solutions subject, of course, to most careful scrutiny and
the Commission's power to require modifications. Up to the time of writing the Coin-
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For insolvent companies the familiar procedures of the Bankruptcy
Act are available but, pursuant to Section ii (f) of the Holding
Company'Act, no plan of reorganization for a registered holding company or a subsidiary thereof can be submitted to the court until the
plan has been approved by the Commission after notice and oppor22
tunity for hearing.
Proceedings under Section ii (b) are instituted only after thorough study of available data by the Commission's staff. 23 A "notice
of and order for hearing" is issued by the Commission, directed to the
companies concerned. It contains a comprehensive statement of the
results of the study and outlines the matters to be considered at the
hearing. Answers may be filed by the respondent companies, and
other interested persons (including municipalities and state commissions and officials) may intervene or be heard. The hearing is held
before a trial examiner whose function is to preside and rule on the
admissibility of evidence and on procedural matters. The case is
opened by counsel for the Public Utilities Division of the Commission's staff. Normally there is no dispute with respect to the basic
facts, the main issues generally relating to conclusions of fact or to matters of statutory interpretation, and the practice is to introduce written
statements containing factual data as to physical properties, corporate
structures, and financial condition. All the participants have the right
to cross-examine and produce evidence, and after the close of the hearing may file proposed findings, briefs, and exceptions to the examiner's
rulings.2 4 The full Commission hears oral argument upon the request
mission has not found it necessary to enforce a plan under Section iI (d). The procedure established by Section ii takes precedence over other proceedings which would
interfere with the Commission's or the Court's functions under Section ii, and interference will be stayed or enjoined. Dederick v. North American Co., 48 F. Supp. 410
(S. D. N. Y. 1943) ; In re Standard Power & Light Corp., 48 F. Supp. 716 (D. Del.
1943) ; North American Co., 9 S. E. C. 617 (1941). Cf. New England Gas & Electric
Ass'n, SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 4158 (1943).
22.

The Commission's approval of a plan pursuant to Section II (f), 49 STAT. 822

(1935), 15 U. S. C. §79k (f) (I94I), is merely a condition precedent to consideration of the plan by the District Court. No party is "aggrieved" by the Commission's order of approval and an appeal from it will not lie to a Circuit Court of Appeals. Gilbert v. SEC, 146 F. (2d) 513 (C. C. A. 7th, 1944).
23. Section ii(a) provides: "It shall be the duty of the Commission to examine
the corporate structure of every registered holding company and subsidiary company
thereof, the relationships among the companies in the holding-company system of every
such company and the character of the interests thereof and the properties owned or
controlled thereby to determine the extent to which the corporate structure of such
holding-company system and the companies therein may be simplified, unnecessary complexities therein eliminated, voting power fairly and equitably distributed among the
holders of securities thereof, and the properties and business thereof confined to those
necessary or appropriate to the operations of an integrated public-utility system." 49
STAT. 820 (I935), 15 U. S. C. § 79k (a) (94I).
24. Frequently, counsel for the Public Utilities Division is called upon to serve
on each of the parties a "proposed findings and opinion" which contains a detailed
statement of the case together'with the recommendations of the Division as to the outcome. This document serves the purpose of narrowing the issues for the parties, who
may direct their objections or supporting arguments to specific points and need not,
unless they wish, restate the whole case.
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of any party, and issues its written opinion incorporating its findings
(in narrative form) on which it bases its order.
The Commission's opinion discusses at length the reasons for the
nature of its order under Section ii (b), but the order itself is normally framed so as to afford management the widest latitude in selecting appropriate methods for achieving the required results. 25 The
order anticipates that the company will file a plan of compliance under
Section i i (e), and that in default of an acceptable company plan
filed in time to effect compliance within one year (or within a period
not to exceed two years if the Commission grants an extension) 28 the
Commission may proceed under Section ii (d) to consider and en27
force a plan without the cooperation of the company.
When a plan of compliance is filed the Commission issues a
"notice of filing and order for hearing," summarizing the terms of the
plan, listing the matters to be given particular consideration at the
hearing, and requiring that copies of the notice be sent to all known
security holders in addition to being published in the usual manner. 28
The hearings are usually attended by representatives of the various
interests affected, including committees for publicly held securities, and
by individual stockholders. The proceedings are conducted in much
the same way as the others already described, except that the proponents of the plan open the case in support of the plan, and the function of counsel for the Public Utilities Division is primarily to see
that the material facts of the case are fully explored, included in the
record, and presented to the Commission. If controversy develops
the case is briefed and argued as in other proceedings. 29 Whether or
not there is a controversy, the Commission examines the plan in the
light of all applicable standards and issues its findings and opinion
supporting the order approving (with or without modification) or disapproving the plan.
III. SIMPLIFICATION TECHNIQUES
The first holding companies to take action toward compliance with
Section ii did so in relatively simple steps. One method was for a
25. This is in accordance with the Congressional intent. Curiously, the latitude
given to the management was one of the main points of objection raised (unsuccessfully) in the first appeal from an order issued under Section ii (b) (2), 49 STAT. 821
(i935), i5 U. S. C. § 79k (b) (2) ('941). Commonwealth & Southern Corp. v. SEC,
134 F. (2d) 747, 750-I (C. C. A. 3d, 1943).

26. Section ii (c) of the Act, 49 STAT. 821 (1935), 15 U. S. C. §79k (c) (i94i).
27. Commonwealth & Southern Corp. v. SEC, i34 F. (2d) 747, 751 (C. C. A. 3d,
1943).
See note 21 supra.
28. Under the Federal Register Act, 49 STAT. 500 (1035), 44 U. S. C. § 301-4
(94), notices, orders, rules, and other documents are published in the Federal Reg-

ister. The
newspapers,
have placed
29. See

Commission does not stop there, however, but makes copies available to
services, financial publications, and hundreds of firms and individuals who
their names on its mailing lists.
note 24 supra.
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holding company to transform itself into an operating company by
merging with' its operating subsidiaries.3 0 Other methods were for the
holding company to dispose of stock interests in unrelated properties,
which were not retainable under Section ii (b) (i), in exchange for
stock interests in other properties the acquisition of which tended toward the development of an integrated utility system; 31 to simplify the
corporate structure of its underlying system by merging several operating subsidiaries into one; 32 to liquidate or otherwise eliminate intermediate holding companies; 33 to dispose of unretainable stock interests
by distributing them to the holding company's own security holders ; 34
and to combine several steps of this kind with the eventual liquidation
of the holding company itself.3 5 Subsequent steps, involving combinations of the foregoing methods and a few others, have sometimes been
of great complexity and have required special reorganization techniques
applied in the light of novel factors, to be discussed below.
Not only must the Commission find such steps "necessary to effectuate the provisions of" Section i i (b) and "fair and equitable" to the
persons affected, but it must also examine each integral part to see
that it conforms with special standards contained in other sections of
the Act, for example: the reasonableness of the price and terms of any
acquisition or disposition of assets governed by Sections 1o or 12; the
character of any financing by new securities governed by the standards
of Sections 6 or 7; 36 the adequacy of depreciation reserves and of
annual charges for depreciation; the segregation, amortization, or
elimination of inflationary items contained in asset accounts; 3 maintenance of competitive conditions in the issuance of new securities and
the sale of portfolio securities; 3s and numerous other matters.
30. Montana-IDakota Utilities Co., i S. E. C. 299 (1936); Nevada-California
Power Co., i S. E. C. 773 (1936).
31. Massachusetts Utilities Associates, 2 S. E. C. 98 (1937).
32. East St. Louis Light & Power Co., 2 S. E. C. 361 (1937).

33. American Water Works & Electric Co. Inc., 2 S. E. C. 972 (1937) ; Massachusetts Utilities Associates, 2 S. E. C. 98 (1937) ; North American Co., 4 S. E. C.
434 (939).
34. Penn Western Gas & Electric Co., 3 S. E. C. 280 (1938).
35. Republic Electric Power Corp., 3 S. E. C. 992 (1938).
36. See Utilities Power & Light Corp., 5 S. E. C. 483, 512 (939) ; American Gas
& Power Co., 3 S. E. C. 9ii, 927 (1938) ; United Telephone & Electric Co., 3 S. E. C.
653 (1938).
37. See Kripke, A Case Study in the Relationship of Law and Accounting; Uniform Accounts 1o.5 and so7 (1944) 57 HARV. L. REv. 433, 693.
38. North American Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 5870 (1945);
Capital Transit Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 5575 (1945); OhioMidland Light & Power Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 4930 (944).

See also Dayton Power & Light Co., 8 S. E. C. 950 (i94i), aff'd sub norn. Morgan
Stanley & Co. Inc. v. SEC, 126 F. (2d) 325 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942). Cf. J. P. Morgan &
Co. Inc., io S. E. C. 119 (1941).
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As we have previously indicated, we cannot undertake to review
here the Commission's scrutiny into the more detailed aspects of proposed transactions subject to its approval but must limit ourselves to
the broader aspects of the operation of Section ii, which deal with
what steps are "necessary" to fulfill its over-all objectives and what
adjustments of legal rights are "fair and equitable."
Great latitude must be allowed in determining what steps are
"necessary," for the methods selected for simplifying an overburdened
capital structure or the structure of a complex corporate system are not
usually the only methods for achieving the necessary results. Alternative methods may be just as good as the particular steps proposed in
any given case. In recognition of this fact the Commission has held
that a plan may be approved as "necessary" under Section ii (e) if
it is a suitable nieans of achieving results which are necessary to the
effectuation of the provisions of Section i i (b).31

Since Congress had made mandatory the attainment of the objectives expressed in the Act, and since all classes of security holders are
afforded ample opportunity to protect their rights through participation in proceedings on the plan before the Commission and the District
Courts (and, if aggrieved, through appeal from any final order relating to the plan), the consent of security holders to adjustments designed to effect the statutory purposes has been held to be unnecessary.4 ° The existence of a veto power by security holders might in
many cases prevent compliance with the Act just as in recapitalizations under State procedures the veto power of junior security holders
may operate to deprive higher-ranking classes of fair and equitable
treatment. 4 1 However, the Commission has on occasion approved
39. Jacksonville Gas Co., ii S. E. C. 449 (1942), plan enforced, In re Jacksonville Gas Co., 46 F. Supp. 852 (S. D. Fla. 1942); North Continent Utilities Corp.,
SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 4686 (I943), plan enforced, In re North
Continent Utilities Corp., 54 F. Supp. 527 (D. Del. 1944); United Gas Corp., SEC
Holding Company Act Release No. 5271 (1944), plan enforced, In re United Gas
Corp., 58 F. Supp. 5Ol (D. Del. 1944); North Shore Gas Co., io S. E. C. 504, 515,
518-9 (1941); United Corp., SEC Holding Company Act Releases Nos. 544o (1944),
5812 (1945). appeal pendinq sub nor. Phillips v. SEC, (C. C. A. 2d, No. 19623).
Where a particular step is taken, it must conform to the standards applicable to the
program of compliance as a whole. Engineers Public Service Co., SEC Holding
Company Act Release No. 4559 (943).
40. Jacksonville Gas Co., ii S. E. C. 449 (1942), plan enforced, In re Jacksonville Gas Co., 46 F. Supp. 852 (S. D. Fla. 1942) ; United Light & Power Co., SEC
Holding Company Act Release No. 4215 (1943), plai enforced, 51 F. Supp. 217 (D.
Del. 1943), aff'd sub non. Otis & Co. v. SEC, 323 U. S. 624 (1945); Puget Sound
Power & Light Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 4255 (1943), plan entforced without opinion, 49 F. Supp. 54 (D. Mass. 1943).

41. See Dodd, Fair and Equitable Recapitalizations (942) 55 HARV. L. REv. 780;
Latty, Fairness-The Focal Point in Preferred Stock Arrearage Elimination (1942)
29 VA. L. REv. i; Securities and Exchange Commission Report on Protective and
Reorganization Committees, Part VII, pp. 109-187 (1940).
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provisions in plans calling for general stockholder approval 42 or even
43
individual stockholders' acceptances.
There is a distinct relation between the simplification process under
the Act and the manner in which a system was put together. Acquisitions made in the process of building up a holding-company system
often carried with them the pre-existing capital structures of the units
acquired. In addition, the capital structures of the top companies were
often devised without any concern for simplicity or soundness. Such
factors resulted in overstratified capital structures in some systems requiring simplification in the form of elimination of one or more classes
of senior securities in an appropriate manner so as to reduce the holding company's capitalization to a single class of common stock. 44 The
manner in which some systems grew up resulted in the presence of
corporate entities serving no useful function and making necessary
their elimination, in some cases through their merger with other system companies 45 and in others through transfer or distribution of their
assets and their dissolution. 46 The security structures of utility companies themselves were occasionally unduly complicated and distributed
voting power unfairly, with the result that a thoroughgoing reorganization of such companies has been necessary in order to satisfy the
42. Community Power & Light Co., 6 S. E. C. 182 (1939), plan enforced, 33 F.

Supp. 9Oi (S. D. N. Y. 1940); Columbia Gas & Electric Corp., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 3885 (1942), plan. enforced mtb iwnt. Application of SEC, 50
F. Supp. 965 (D. Del. 1943). In Commonwealth & Southern Corp., SEC Holding
Company Act Release No. 5825 (945), the Commission cautioned that its approval
of the provision for a stockholders' vote did not mean that it might not later proceed if
necessary under Section ii (d), 49 STAT. 821 (1935), 15 U. S. C. § 79k (d) (941),
to enforce a plan conforming with statutory standards without stockholder approval.
After rehearing, the Commission withdrew its approval of the provision for a vote
on the ground that a substantial period of time had elapsed without the vote having
been held or arrangements for the vote having been completed. Commonwealth &
Southern Corp., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 6177 (1945).
43. United Corp., SEC Holding Company Act Releases Nos. 5440 (1944), 5812
(945),
appeal pending sub no n. Phillips v. SEC, (C. C. A. 2d, No. 19623);
Electric Bond & Share Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 4400 (1943)
National Power & Light Co., IO S. E. C. 827 (1941) ; Standard Gas & Electric Co.,
7 S. E. C. 1089 (1940), plan inodified, 8 S. E. C. 481 (1941).

There is normally no

necessity for a general stockholders' vote on exchanges or distributions as to which
individual stockholders' acceptance is provided, and such transactions have nearly
always been effectuated without such vote. A vote was provided for, however, in such
a situation in National Power & Light Co., 1o S. E. C. 827 (1941).
44. Commonwealth & Southern Corp., SEC Holding Company Act Release No.
3432 (1942), af'd, Commoriwealth & Southern Corp. v. SEC, 134 F. (2d) 747 (C. C.
A. 3d, 1943) ; Middle West Corp., ii S. E. C. 533 (1942), aff'd, Central & South West

Utilities Co. v. SEC, 136 F. (2d) 273 (App. D. C. 1943) ; Community Gas & Power
Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 4395 (1943) ; Cities Service Co., SEC
Holding Company Act Release No. 4944 (1944).
45. Federal Water Service Corp., 8 S. E. C. 893 (1941) ; International Utilities
Corp., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 4896 (1944); Western Light &
Telephone Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 59o2 (1945).
46. American Power & Light Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 3750
(1942), aff'd, American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 141 F. (2d) 6o6 (C. C. A. ist,
1944), cert. granted, 323 U. S. 701 (945); International Hydro-Electric System,
SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 3679 (I942), af'd msb nom. Todd v. SEC,
137 F. (2d) 475 (C. C. A. 6th, 1943).
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requirements of Section I 1. 4 7 Or the value of the assets of which
the holding company must divest itself under Section II (b) (1) may
sometimes be such that the retirement of holding-company senior se48
curities is a corollary necessity.

Each system thus presents its own problems affecting its attainment of the objectives of Section ii. Although the problems are
varied and require specific solutions, they are nevertheless interrelated.
The simplification of a system or even the correction of complexities or
inequities in one company will often bring into play a wide variety of
techniques, each of which complements the others and aids the consummation of the entire program of compliance with the Section.
While no one of the systems affected by the Section has represented
all the types of situations that have arisen in the course of the Commission's administration, in order to present a concrete illustration of
how specific simplification techniques are devised and applied for the
solution of a system's problems we shall describe one system and the
steps taken or proposed for its simplification. We shall discuss subsequently the questions which have arisen with respect to the determination of what constitutes fair and equitable treatment to various
classes of security holders and other claimants whose rights are affected
under a plan of simplification or its component or related steps.
An Illustrative System: The United Light and Power Company
and Its Subsidiaries
The system headed by the United Light and Power Company
(hereinafter referred to as "Power") is not chosen as an example of
extreme complexity of structure or diversity of operations. In this
respect it may be regarded as fairly representative of a number of sys47. Jacksonville Gas Co., ii S. E. C. 449 (1942), plan enforced, In re Jacksonville
Gas Co., 46 F. Supp. 852 (S. D. Fla. 1942) ; Puget Sound Power & Light Co., SEC
Holding Company Act Release No. 4255 (1943), plant enforced wuithout opinion, 49 F.

Supp. 54 (D. Mass. 1943); Southern Colorado Power Co., SEC Holding Company
Act Release No. 4501 (1943), plan enforced zithout opinion, D. Colo. 1944, aff'd sub
norn. Disman v. SEC, 147 F. (2d) 679 (C. C. A. ioth, 1945), cert. denied, 89 L. Ed.
(Adv. Ops.) Ii6o (1945); Virginia Public Service Co., SEC Holding Company Act
Release No. 4618 (1943); Laclede Gas Light Co., SEC Holding Company Act Releases Nos. 5o62, 5071 (1944), plan enforced, 57 F. Supp. 997 (E. D. Mo. 1944), aff'd
sub norn. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 151 F. (2d) 424 (C. C. A. 8th,
1945) ; Tide Water Power Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 5238 (1944) ;
Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 6167
(1945); Utah Power & Light Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 6212
(1945). See note 19 supra.
48. Standard Gas & Electric Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 5430
(I944) ; the order of the District Court, which disapproved the plan, 59 F. Supp. 274
(D. Del. 1945), was reversed and remanded, 151 F. (2d) 326 (C. C. A. 3d, 1945) ;
United Corp., SEC Holding Company Act Releases Nos. 5440 (944), 5812 (945),
appeal pending sub noii. Phillips v. SEC, (C. C. A. 2d, No. 19623). Cf. United Gas
Gas Improvement Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 4173 (943).
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tems, and it was of moderate size.4 9 The principal reason for giving
extended consideration to Power's system is that both its development
prior to the impact of Section ii and the program for its simplification
in compliance with that Section highlight many of the varied problems
which the simplification process embraces and illustrate the interrelated
nature of these problems. It is an appropriate system for analysis also
in view of the fact that one phase of the plan for its simplification, approved by the Commission under Section ii (e), was recently considered by the United States Supreme Court in Otis & Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission. °
Before instituting proceedings under Section Ii (b) with respect
to this system the Commission, through the staff of its Public Utilities
Division, made a thorough study of its history and structure, as contemplated by Section ii (a).51 There has been no controversy as to
5
the basic facts.

2

Power had its origin in 191o as a small Maine corporation controlling electric, gas, and transportation companies in Iowa, Illinois,
Indiana, Tennessee, and Michigan. The system had grown slowly up
49. Extremes as to both complexity and size would be well illustrated by the Associated Gas & Electric Company system, simplification of which is being carried out by
trustees under the direction of the bankruptcy court and the Commission. This system in its heyday comprised scores of companies with consolidated assets stated at over
one billion dollars and contained tiers of holding companies ranging to as many as
eight or more levels. The parent corporation alone had outstanding twenty-two
differently-styled securities, which, if further classified according to series, interest,
and dividend rates, etc., comprised eighty-five different categories. See Clarke, Trustee of Associated Gas & Electric Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 4985
(1944), plan approved,In re Associated Gas & Electric Co., 61 F. Supp. ii (S. D. N.
Y. 1944), aff'd, 149 F. (2d) 96 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945), cert. denied, 89 L. Ed. (Adv.
Ops.) 42 (i945) ; Associated Gas & Electric Co., ii S. E. C. 975 (942).
50. 323 U. S. 624 (945), rehearing denied, 324 U. S. 887 (945).
The rule of

law upon which the Supreme Court passed applies to one segment of an over-all program of system simplification. At the time of this writing, twenty-five separate applications have been filed by the system management proposing various steps in the overall program of compliance with Section 11, 49 STAT. 820 (1935), 15 U. S. C. § 79k
(i94i). The step considered by the Supreme Court was proposed in Application No.
14.

51. See note 23 supra.
52. A staff report dealing with the system's problems under Section ix (b) (2),
49 STAT. 821 (I935), i5 U. S. C. §79k (b) (2) (i941), was prepared and submitted

to the Commission which thereupon instituted proceedings under that section. After
minor corrections were made in the report at the suggestion of the respondents, the
facts stated in the staff's report as thus revised were accepted as accurate and were
received in evidence. Report of the Public Utilities Division to the Securities and
Exchange Commission with respect to the Holding Company System of The United
Light and Power Company and Its Subsidiary Companies as to Compliance with Section xx (b) (2) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (rev. 1941)
United Light & Power Co., 8 S. E. C. 837, 838-9 (i941).
The facts in the revised report were supplemented by evidence at the hearings
in the Section ii (b) (2) proceedings, as well as at subsequent hearings under Section ii (b) (i) and those on the management's numerous applications proposing
successive steps under Section ii (e) for compliance with Section ii (b). The several proceedings have been consolidated for the sake of keeping a complete record
always before the Commission.
Except as otherwise noted, the historical and financial data set out in the ensuing discussion of Power's system through the year 1939 have been taken from or
computed on the basis of the staff's revised report.
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to 1923, when Power was reorganized as a Maryland corporation. At
this time annual consolidated gross revenues were about $12,000,000.
In 1924, Power, through a subholding company, United Light and
Railways Company ("Railways"), acquired about 75% of the common stock of a much larger concern, Continental Gas & Electric Corporation ("Continental").3 This company, also a holding company,
had electric utility subsidiaries operating in Nebraska, Iowa, and Missouri, with consolidated gross revenues of about $21,ooo,ooo annually.
The properties thus acquired were mostly far removed from and were
never interconnected with those previously controlled by Power.
Late in 1924, Power further acquired a substantial common stock
interest in American Light & Traction Company ("Traction"), a
holding company controlling mainly gas companies which operated in
Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota, and at more remote points such
as San Antonio, Texas, and Binghamton, New York, with consolidated gross revenues of about $33,000,000 annually. The properties
of Traction bore no physical or operating relationship either to Power's
original group or to the Continental group. Power continued to acquire Traction's stock on the open market, for a time in active competition with the Mellon-Koppers interests, until rapidly rising prices
compelled the rival forces to negotiate. Finally, in 1928, Power obtained a majority control of Traction by a deal in which it took over
United American Company ("United American") from Koppers.
United American had been the holding company through which Koppers had held Traction stock. In the meantime the Mellon-Koppers
interests had acquired a substantial block of Power's own voting stock.
Beginning in 1924, Power also purchased stock of the Detroit
Edison Company in aggressive competition with North American Company. It never succeeded in gaining control of Detroit Edison,5 4 but
the contest had resulted in excessive prices being paid by both purchasers.
The last important addition to the system occurred in 1930, when
Railways subscribed for 35% of the common stock of Northern Natural
Gas Company, which was formed primarily to own and operate a gas
pipeline from Texas to Wisconsin and neighboring states.
The growth of the system, primarily through these methods, resulted in an increase in annual gross revenues from about $12,000,000
53. Power later acquired almost ioo% of Continental's common stock.
54. The Commission later determined in proceedings under Section 2 (a) (8) of
the Act, 49 STAT. 8o7 (1935), 15 U. S. C. § 79b (a) (8) (I94I), that Detroit Edison
was a subsidiary of North American and was not subject to a controlling influence by
Power, though the latter (through Traction) held over 20% of Detroit Edison's voting stock. Detroit Edison Co., 7 S. E. C. 968 (1940), aff'd, 119 F. (2d) 73o (C. C. A.
6th, 1941), cert. denied, 314 U. S. 618 (1941).
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in 1924 to more than-$84,ooo,ooo in 193o, excluding Detroit Edison
and Northern Natural. 55
Power's system in i93o consisted of several subholding-company
systems comprising some seventy-five companies of various kinds. During the 193os and the early part of 194o at least twenty-three corporate

entities were eliminated by consolidation or dissolution, and some were
sold. A number of these and other steps tending toward compliance
with the Act took place after February, 1938, when Power and Railways registered as holding companies under the Act, and these were
subject to the Commission's jurisdiction, 6 as were other steps taken
to finance construction programs, 57 and to acquire additional utility
properties that could be interconnected with facilities already owned.5 8
In general, however, the complexities that resulted from the system's
mode of growth were still present at the beginning of 1940, when the
system comprised seven registered holding companies and forty-three
other companies (including twenty-two electric and gas utilities, seven
transportation, water or ice companies, one system service company, and
thirteen companies which were engaged in other businesses). A simplified corporate chart is shown on the opposite page depicting the
structure as of December 31, 1939. The solid connecting lines indicate

solid control, and the dotted lines indicate holdings of less than majority
voting power.
It'will be seen at once from the chart that there were either three
or four tiers of holding companies above the utility operating companies
in the Traction, Continental, and Northern Natural Gas systems. This
structure was in clear conflict with the mandate of Section i i (b) (2),
particularly the "great-grandfather" clause which made it necessary
for the Commission to order prompt reduction of the tiers of holding
55. In 193o, Detroit Edison's gross revenues exceeded $53,700,000 and it paid
nearly $io,ooo,ooo in dividends on its common stock (with net income after preferred
dividends reported at $i,117,ooo).

Northern Natural was just starting in 193o, but

by 1936 its gross revenues were exceeding $9,ooo,ooo annually.
56. Consolidations: American Light & Traction Co., Michigan Consolidated Gas
Co., 3 S.E. C. 969 (1938) ; Peoples Light Co., 4 S.E. C. ig (1938) ; Milwaukee Gas
Light Co., 5 S. E. C. 359 (939).

Sales: United Light & Power Co., 6 S. E. C. 670 (0940).
Revision of organization and operation of system's service company so as to provide for fair determination and allocation of service costs under Section 13, 49 STAT.
825 (1935), 15 U. S. C. §79m (1941): United Light & Power Engineering & Con-

struction. Co., 3 S.E. C. 894 (938).
C. 738 (1941).

Cf. United Light & Power Service Co., 8 S.E.

Refinancings to improve capital structures and earnings coverages: San Antonio
Public Service Co., S.E. C. 414 (938) ; San Antonio Public Service Co., 5 S. E. C.
336 (i939); Iowa-Nebraska Light & Power Co., 5 S. E. C. 344 (i939). See also
Peoples Natural Gas Co., Argus Natural Gas Co. Inc., 6 S.E. C. 231 (939).
57. Madison Gas & Electric Co., 4 S. E. C. 50 (938); Columbus & Southern
Ohio Electric Co., 4 S.E. C. 278 (938); Northern Natural Gas Co., 5 S. E. C. 56i
(i939).
58. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 6 S.E. C. i66 (1939) ; Peoples Light-Co., 6 S.E. C.

,561 (i94o).
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Power (H)
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Pwr. Mfg. Co ......
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-Iowa-Nebraska (H)
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Other
(Subsidiaries
..

Northern Natural Gas (H)
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Subsidiaries

{ Eleven Other
Subsid iaries

* {Twelve

Subsidiaries

Detroit Edisont

* The voting power in Traction held by Railways, United American, and United
Power Manufacturing Company was, in the aggregate, about 52%.
+ Declared not to be a subsidiary (see note 54 supra).
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companies to not more than two. 59 This statutory requirement works
automatically, but the reasoning behind it is not hard to find. The
capitalization and earnings history of the system companies provide
the clue.
The capitalization of the system was highly stratified at each of
the principal corporate levels by the existence of outstanding debt and
preferred stocks. This stratification is shown on the accompanying
chart of publicly held senior securities which are presented as a pyramid that has been inverted, starting with the operating companies at
the base and progressing downward toward the point in order to illustrate the principle that the quality of the securities tends to diminish
as their degree of removal from the operating base increases. The
chart gives the approximate amounts of senior securities outstanding
as of the end of 1939, excluding intrasystem holdings and the securities
60
of Detroit Edison and Northern Natural Gas.
Except for the minority interest in Traction's common stock held
by the public (as shown in the chart), Power directly or indirectly
held virtually all the junior equity interests in the operating and subholding companies. The junior equity interest in Power itself was
represented by Class A and Class B common stocks, which were coequal except that all the voting power was vested in the Class B. It
will be noted that these common stocks were subject to no less than
$430,000,000 of outstanding senior securities. The junior equity represented by Power's common stocks was about $9,700,000 for the Class
A and $4,200,000 for the Class B, on the basis of the consolidated bal-

ance sheet. Power had no earned or capital surplus.
In summary, from base to apex there were at least nine strata of
publicly held senior securities with their several fixed interest rates
(ranging from 2.75% to 6.57o) and fixed dividend requirements (ranging from 6% to 8%o) which had to be paid before any earnings could
be attributed to Power's common stock-not to mention the three to
four tiers of corporations each with its own expenses, taxes and fixed
charges other than interest. Small variations in the amount of revenues
taken in by the operating subsidiaries at the base were naturally magnified with each layer of corporate expenses, fixed charges and fixed
dividends, with the result that slight fluctuations in system revenues
produced violent swings in the consolidated net income figures, and
59. "In carrying out the provisions of this paragraph the Commission shall require each registered holding company (and any company in the same holding-company system with such holding company) to take such action as the Commission shall
find necessary in order that such holding company shall cease to be a holding company
with respect to each of its subsidiary companies which itself has a subsidiary company
which is a holding company." 49 STAT. 821 (1935), 15 U. S. C. §79k (b) (2) (1941).
6o. Both of these companies had very large amounts of securities outstanding.
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Operating Subsidiaries of Continental and of Traction
$16o,ooo,ooo
Funded debt
26,400,000

Preferred stocks

$186,400,000

Total

Continental

Traction

$50,000,000
Funded debt
Preferred stock I1,7oo,ooo

$40,000,000
Funded debt
10,300,000
Preferred stock

Total

Total

$61,700,000

$50,300,000

common stock held by I
public, about 45%
L-_

Railways
Funded debt
Preferred stock

$24,400,000

Total

$43,700,000

19,300,000

Power
First Lien Bonds*
Debentures
Preferred stock
Total

$17,250,000
19,850,000
6o,ooo,ooo
$97,100,000

These bonds were exceptional in that they were secured by liens on property and
securities of twelve direct subsidiaries of Power hereafter referred to as the "First Lien
companies," and were therefore independent of the base formed by the Continental and
Traction subsidiaries.
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there existed numerous potential blocks in the intrasystem flow of cash
earnings.
In the lush years when the system was put together, this leverage
factor was an apparent advantage to Power's common stockholders
because so much of the system's capital had been contributed by the
public holders of limited-income securities, while any gains in net earnings were to be available for dividends on the common stock. 61 Actually, however, as far as Power was concerned the leverage worked
the other way and the flow of earnings--complex at best-became
blocked before they reached even Power's preferred stock which was
about $:28,oooooo in arrears on its dividends by the end of 1939.

The earnings flow is, of course, an important factor in any holdingcompany structure, and the holding company's corporate net income
may differ greatly from consolidated net earnings. The latter is merely
a statistical figure indicating in general the amount of system net income applicable to the equity securities of the top holding company.
It may be very different from what can actually be drawn up in cash by
the top company because there often exist many reasons why a subsidiary cannot or should not pay cash dividends equal to the amount
of its net income. For example, the subsidiary may need its cash for
construction of new facilities, or for debt retirements, or for other
purposes; or the payment of dividends may be restricted by indenture
covenants, by charter provisions, or by law or regulatory order, for
the protection of the investment of senior security, holders or to insure
adequate utility service to consumers. It is entirely natural that the
more corporate complexities there are in the system, the more hazards
there are in the flow of earnings. This is well illustrated by a comparison of the consolidated net income with Power's corporate net income in the period 1935-1939:

Year
1935

1936
1937

1938
1939

Net Income Before Power's Preferred
Dividend Requirements
Corsolidated
Corporate
$ 2,411,652
4,5o8,26i
5, 182,602
3,091,5o8
4,598,654

$

$19,792,677

$3,805,284

311,268
121,851
402,139
627,594
2,342,432

6i. About 3% of total consolidated capitalization was represented by Power's
common stock, and the voting or Class B stock represented less than i%.
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Disregarding this factor, however, and taking consolidated figures
alone, the magnification of slight changes in operating company revenues is an impressive feature of the stratified security structure. To
give an extreme example of this kind of leverage in Power's system,
in 1935 an increase of 5% in gross operating revenues produced an
increase of I44% in the amount applicable to Power's preferred stock.
The fluctuations in consolidated revenues and earnings reported for
the calendar years 1931 to 1939 were as follows:

Year Ended
December 31

7 of Change Over Preceding Year
Income
Net Income
Applicable
Applicable to
Gross Operatto Power's
Power's
ing Revenues*
Fixed Charges
Preferred Stock

1931
1932
1933

-6
-8
-7

-19
-35
-43

-

1934
1935

+4t
+5

-13t
+40

- 35t
+144

1936

+9

±41

+ 87

+5

+ 9
-28

+
-

+227

+ 49

1937
1938

1939

-3
+5

25
47
64

15
40

* The percentage changes in gross operating revenues have been computed from

MOODY, MANUAL OF INVESTMENTS, PUBLIC UTILITIES (1937) 498, (1940) 1625.
i
t The drop in income applicable to Power's fixed charges and preferred dividends
in 1934, despite the 4% increase in revenues, is explained by a material increase over
1933 in operating expenses, maintenance, taxes, and depreciation.

Faced with the foregoing problems and recognizing the necessity
of complying with Section ii, the management of Power co-operated
at the hearings and in conferences with the Commission's staff in the
difficult process of deciding what steps should be taken, and in what
order. After considering the major holding companies and the possibilities of eliminating each, the management concluded that Power lent
itself best to dissolution as a major step toward compliance with the
"great-grandfather" clause-an objective which the Commission had
62
indicated should be achieved first.
To achieve this step the management proposed: (a) that the
properties of most of Power's directly-held subsidiaries, called the
"First Lien" companies, be transferred to a single new subsidiary which
would assume all liability on Power's First Lien bonds; (b) that
62. United Light & Power Co. 8 S. E. C. 837, 840-4 (1941).
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Power's outstanding debentures be paid off in cash at par and accrued
interest; (c) that Railways acquire all of Power's remaining assets
except the common stock of Railways itself; and (d) that the Railways common stock be distributed on a fair and equitable basis among
the holders of Power's preferred, Class A and Class B stocks. 3 The
dissolution of United American was also proposed, and presented no
problem since that company was wholly owned by Railways. The
Commission approved these proposed steps in broad outline and issued
its order directing the respondents to proceed with due diligence to
bring about the liquidation and dissolution of Power and United
American, and to make application to the Commission for the entry of
such further orders as might be necessary or appropriate for that purpose. 64 The proposed steps were recognized as bringing about only
partial compliance with Section ii (b), and the remaining problems
65
were reserved for separate consideration.
The plan as thus approved in outline was subsequently put into
effect, the detailed steps being presented to the Commission in several
applications which, with modifications, were finally approved. 0 The
fairness of the treatment received by Power's different classes of security holders will be discussed in the next section of this article.
Concurrently with the consideration of these steps a number of
other transactions were taking place: properties and businesses were
being disposed of while others were being acquired; 67 senior securities
63. The manner of making this distribution was to be proposed later for Commission approval. Id. at 845 n. ii.
64. Id. at 846.
65. Id. at 848-9.
66. Cash was first provided by Railways' sale of its common stock interest in
Northern Natural Gas Company. United Light & Power Co., io S. E. C. 17 (i94i).
The Commission had previously held that this investment (among others) could not
be retained by Railways under the provisions of Section ii (b) (), 49 STAT. 820
(1935), 15 U. S. C. §79k (b) (i) (i940). United Light & Power Co., 9 S.E. C. 833
(194). The cash so obtained was paid by Railways to a new subsidiary for its common stock, and the new subsidiary used such cash to purchase Power's equity in nine
of the First Lien companies, also assuming all of Power's liability on the First Lien
bonds (which were secured by assets and securities of such companies). United Light
& Power Co., io S. E. C. 945 (1941). Using the cash received from the sale of its
equity in the First Lien companies, Power paid off its debentures at par and accrued
interest, without premium. United Light & Power Co., io S. E. C. 1215 (i942), aff'd
sub norn. New York Trust Co. v. SEC, 131 F. (2d) 274 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942), cert.
denied, 318 U. S. 786 (943), rehearing denied, 319 U.'S. 781 (943).

As a final step the common stock of Railways was distributed among Power's preferred and common stockholders, 9!% going to the preferred and 5% to the common.
United Light & Power Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 4215 (1943),
plan approved and enforced, 5i F. Supp. 217 (D. Del. 1943), aff'd sub norn. Otis
& Co. v. SEC, 142 F. (2d) 411 (C. C. A. 3d, 1944), aff'd, 323 U. S. 624 (945), rehearing denied, 324 U. S. 887 (945).

67. Sales and acquisitions effected: United Light & Power Co., SEC Holding

Company Act Releases Nos. 3667, 3688 (1942), 4740 (943), 5619 (1945) ; Michigan

Consolidated Gas Co., 8 S.E. C. 550 (i940; American Light & Traction Co., SEC
Holding Company Act Release No. 4774 (943) ; United Light & Railways Co., SEC
Holding Company Act Releases Nos. 4497 (1943), 5943 (1945). Cf. United Light &
Power Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 3316 (1942).
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of the system were reduced; 65 refinancings at lower interest rates were
effected or proposed; 69 and greater net earnings for the system were in
prospect owing to plans for the elimination of complexities in the system's structure. 70
Definite plans for completion of the simplification program include: retirement of Traction's preferred stock and liquidation of the
company; retirement of Continental's debentures and preferred stock;
sales of unretainable properties and businesses, and acquisition of other
utilities by Continental to complete its integration program; and re-

tirement of Railways' debt and most of its preferred stock. 71
The ultimate effect of carrying out these plans would be to leave
a system of nine or ten utility operating companies, fully integrated, the
common stocks of which would be owned by Continental, which in
turn would be almost wholly owned by Railways and would have no
senior securities outstanding. Railways itself would have no debt and
only a small amount of preferred stock. On a pro forma basis Continental's investments in subsidiaries would reflect a cost of about
$54,000,000, and the consolidated net income applicable to Railways'

common stock (1944 earnings pro forma to reflect one year's operations under the proposed structure) would presumably fall within a
range of from $5,ooo,ooo to $7,400,000.72
68. In United Light & Power Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 3892
(1942), the Commission approved the payment of Traction's entire outstanding debt
out of proceeds from the sale of a nonretainable subsidiary.
69. Bonds and preferred stock of Michigan Consolidated Gas Company were refinanced: American Light & Traction Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No.
4954 (1944). Cf. Application No. 23, United Light & Power Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 5652 (945), which proposes to redeem Railways' debentures
using proceeds from a five-year bank loan.
70. See, e. g., American Light & Traction Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 4774 (943).
See also Amended Applications Nos. 21, 25, described infra.
71. Some of these steps were proposed by the Commission (American Light &
Traction Co., SEC Holding Company Act Releases Nos. 5661, 5840 [1945]) and were
adopted in a plan filed by the Company (Amended Application No. 21, see United
Light & Power Co., SEC Holding Company Act Releases Nos. 5926, 6o16 ['9451).
Others are contemplated by Application No. 25. It will be noted that they follow
logically from the Commission's opinion and order of August 5, 1941. United Light
& Power Co., 9 S. E. C. 833 (1941).
Continental's proposed acquisitions have been approved in part (Cities Service
Power & Light Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 5943 [19451), and are
in part pending (United Light & Power Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No.

4988 [19441).

72. The lower ffgure reflects federal taxes at the rates prescribed by the Revenue
Act of 1943, 58 STAT. 21 (I943), 26 U. S. C. § ioi et seq. (Supp. 1944) ; the larger
figure reflects the assumption that consolidated returns will still be permitted and that the
federal tax rates on corporate earnings will aggregate 50o%. See Statements 21 and
26 annexed to Application No. 25, File 54-25-1-22. At the rates prescribed by the Revenue Act of 1945, 79th Cong., ist Sess. 0945) P. L. 214, enacted after the above data
were submitted, pro forma earnings would of course be greater than $7,400,000.
More recently Railways and Continental submitted a refinancing program which
was approved by the Commission, as a result of which the fixed interest charges of
these two companies will be greatly reduced and consolidated net earnings increased.
United Light & Power Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 6249 (1945).
It appears from the Commission's opinion that the consolidated net earnings of Railways' system for the 12 months ended September 3o, 1945, pro forma to reflect the
refinancing and Federal taxes at 1946 rates, would be approximately $7,8ooo0o.
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Since no apparent purpose would be served by continuing the existence of both the holding companies, it is not unreasonable to suppose that one of them will eventually be eliminated in the interest of
economy..

IV.

"FAIR AND EQUITABLE"

TREATMENT OF PERSONS AFFECTED

73
A. Contractual Claims of Security Holders

The various solutions proposed by Power and approved by the

Commission for treatment of Power's bonds, debentures, and preferred
and common stocks present an interesting and fairly representative sample of the treatment of contractual claims in respect of securities affected
by Section II. We therefore shall use these solutions as concrete
illustrations in the discussion which follows, in order to maintain a
central theme for the development of the principles that have been applied in the cases that have arisen under Section I I (e).
In summary, $16,ooo,ooo of the First Lien bonds of Power were
assumed by a new operating subsidiary and were permitted to remain
outstanding with certain modifications, while about $1,250,000 of them
were redeemed at a premium; debentures were paid off at par and
accrued interest, without premium and without the consent of debenture
holders; and the preferred and common stocks received, respectively,
95% and 5% of Power's remaining assets as a final step in the
liquidation of the company.
As in any reorganization case, the question of fairness is a mixed
question of law and financial analysis. It can be determined only after
thorough consideration of the legal rights attaching to each class of
securities affected and the financial data relevant to the value of those
rights.

The phrase "fair and equitable" was developed by the courts in
equity receiverships 74 and was adopted by Congress in the various

reorganization, arrangement, and adjustment sections of the Bankruptcy Act. 7 5 The Supreme Court has stated that these words have
73. Such claims are to be distinguished from security holders' litigation claims
based on mismanagement, etc., of the kind found in Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co., 306 U. S. 307 (1939) and similar cases discussed below under the subheading
"Litigation Claims, Defenses, and Compromises," pp. 187 to 193.
74. See Kansas City Terminal Ry. v. Central Union Trust Co., 271 U. S. 445
(1926) ; Northern Pacific Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482 (1912) ; Louisville Trust Co.
v. Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Ry., 174 U. S. 674 (1899).
75. Section 77 (a), 47 STAT. 1474 (933), 11 U. S. C. §205 (e) (1941); former
Section 77B (f), 48 STAT. 912.(0934), former ii U. S. C. § 207 (f) (1937); Chapter
X, Sections 174 and 221 (2), 52 STAT. 911 (1938), 11 U. S. C. §766 (941); Chapter
XII, Section 472, 52 STAT. 923 (1938), Ir U. S. C. § 872 (1941) ; Chapter XIII, Section 656, 52 STAT. 935 (1938), 1I U. S. C. § 1O56 (1941) ; Chapter XV, Section 725,
53 STAT. 1118 (I939), 11 U. S. C. § 1225 (941).
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acquired a specialized meaning and signify not only that creditors are
entitled to priority over stockholders to the full extent of their claims,"6
but that every security holder, including a holder of stocks, "in the
order of his priority" must receive "the equitable equivalent of the
rights surrendered." 77 This is equivalent to saying that each class
must receive "full compensatory provision"-which must mean fair
value-for the "entire bundle of rights" surrendered by such class in
the reorganization."
This rule seems obvious, but it is not so easy to apply in Section ii reorganizations as one might imagine. Examples from the
Power proceedings will illustrate the problems.
(i) Treatment of "Premium" and "Marginal" Securities
One question that has proved troublesome is that which often rises
when a redeemable security is to be paid off and discharged. If sufficient assets are available to make full payment the question is, shall a
redemption premium be paid as in the case of .voluntary redemptions,
or would payment of a redemption premium result in the payment of
more than the "equitable equivalent" of the rights of the security
holders?
Power's First Lien bonds had a direct first lien on the securities
and part of the fixed properties of twelve operating utilities which were
wholly owned by Power. Thus they were of unusually high quality
for obligations of a holding company, being in all substantial respects
equivalent to bonds of the operating utilities themselves. Bearing
interest at coupon rates of 6% and 5Y270 (for different series), and
being well covered by assets and earnings, 9 they were typically what
we shall call, for want of a better name, "premium" securities. To
have paid them off at par and accrued interest before maturity would
have been clearly unfair to the bondholders.
In permitting $I6,ooo,ooo of the First Lien bonds to be assumed
by a new operating company and remain outstanding while a portion
76. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., Ltd., 3o8 U. S. io6 (i939); SEC
v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 3IO U. S. 434 (1940). See Dodd, The
Los Angeles Lumber Products Company Case and Its Implications (1940) 53 HaV.
L. RFV. 713.

77. Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. P. & P. R. R., 38
U. S. 523, 565-6 (1943) :

that each security holder in the order of his priority receives
sufficient
ir"It
from
thatis which
is available for the satisfaction of his claim the equitable equivalent of the rights surrendered. That requires a comparison of the new securities
allotted to him with the old securities which he exchanges to determine whether
the new are the equitable equivalent of the old."
78. Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U. S.SI, 528 (i94I).
79. Asset coverage was more than 250o% while interest was covered by earnings
more than 31/ times. United Light & Power Co., io S. E. C. 945, 95I-7 (i94i).
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was redeemed at a premium, the Commission in effect found that these
bonds were not of themselves objectionable under Section ii (b) (2),
i.e. that they were not the cause of any undue or unnecessary complexity or any unfair distribution of voting power in the system. The
impact of the Act fell, not upon the bonds, but upon the corporate
entity that was the obligor. The obligor could not continue in existence,
and something had to be done about the bonds, but there was room in
the system below Power's level for continued liability on the bonds.
Consequently, to the extent that Power proposed extinguishing them,
that step was entirely voluntary on its part, and was subject to the
provisions of the indenture applicable to voluntary redemptions. The
bonds that remained outstanding were given ample new security and
other benefits in substitution for such as were withdrawn from them
under the plan. 0
By contrast, the debentures of Power were unsecured obligations
depending for payment on the general credit of the top holding company of a pyramided system. We have seen how the understructure
of the system was burdened by debt and preferred stocks of ' subsidiaries, ranking ahead of Power's debentures."1 They had been
issued at a heavy discount in the early I92os and, although they carried interest coupons at 6% and 6/ 2 %, they had been traded in the
market at prices consistently below par until 1941 (when it began to
appear that they would be paid off at par or better by reason of the
requirements of Section ii [b] of the Act). In 1933 their market
price had reached a low of 25.82 The market quotations for a security
cannot be deemed controlling, and the Commission stated that it would
not consider what price was paid by many of the holders for their
debentures, 83 but all the foregoing factors point to the conclusion that
the debentures were far from being of premium quality. Again for
want of a better name, we shall classify them as "marginal" securities.
None of the debentures was to mature according to its terms before
1973, and the indenture provided that Power, at its election, might redeem the two series by payment of their principal plus a premium of 8%
and 9%, respectively, plus accrued interest. The indenture trustee
and representatives of debenture holders argued before the Commission
that Power's plan of paying them off in cash was an exercise of the
option to redeem, and that consquently the contract required Power
to pay the premium. Power had sufficient cash to pay the premium
but argued that such payment would be unfair to its stockholders. It
8o. United Light & Power Co., io S. E. C. 945, 956-9 (1941).
81. See the chart p. 167 supra.
82. United Light & Power Co., io S. E. C. 1215, 1227 (1942).
83. Id. at 7228.
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took the view that its proposal was not voluntary, but was required
by law since the Company had to be liquidated under the Act and the
Commission's specific order. Power suggested that it pay the principal and interest immediately (thus stopping the further accrual of
interest) and, if the Commission approved, that the Company put in
escrow enough cash to pay the premium in the event the Commission's order of approval were set aside upon judicial review.
The Commission found that extinguishment of the debentures
was required by Section ii (b), in effect holding that they created
an undue complexity in the structure of the system, the capital structures of the underlying companies on a consolidated basis being such
that no company could assume the liability on them, as had been
done in the case of the bonds. s4 It held that payment of the debentures
was not the free exercise of an option by Power, that the indenture
provisions for redemption were therefore inapplicable, and that equitable
considerations apart from the contract did not lead to the conclusion
that the debenture holders should receive any amount above par and
accrued interest for the "bundle of rights" comprising the investment
they were called upbn to surrender."5 This opinion, being one of
first impression in the administration of Section i i, stresses legal concepts and does not contain as much analysis as one could desire with
respect to the investment quality of the debentures; nor does it explain
why payment at principal and accrued interest was the fair equivalent
of both the 6% and 6Y2 % series when the difference in interest
rates would ordinarily call for some differential in investment value.
Recently Commissioner Healy pointed to this fact in a dissenting
opinion 86 to show that the Commission had not considered investment
value to be the test. On this point the majority stated:
"If payment of IOO was fair to the 62 % debenture holders,
the payment of ioo to the 6% debentures would constitute somewhat more generous treatment than might be required. .

.

. How-

ever, there may be reasons why the face amount of a debt claim
is the minimum amount which it may be accorded. .

. ." sT

Whatever may have been the test in the case of Power's debentures,
there can be no doubt that a majority of the Commission has now
adopted the investment-value test to determine whether the considera84. Id. at I2I9.

85. Id. at

1228.

The Commission's order was affirmed on appeal, New York

Trust Co. v. SEC, 131 F. (2d) 274 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942), cert. denied, 318 U. S. 786
(1943), rehearing denied, 319 U. S. 781 (1943).

86. American Power & Light Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 6176

at p. 35 (i945).
87. Id. at p. ii.
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tion given for senior securities retired under Section i i is the equitable
equivalent of the rights surrendered. In American Power & Light
Company, a plan for the payment of 6% debentures at par and
accrued interest was disapproved on the basis of an analysis showing
the high-premium quality of these securities, the Commission majority concluding that "a valuation substantially higher than iiO
would be proper if the debentures were not callable at that figure." 88
The distinction between what we have classified as "premium"
and "marginal" securities is not confined to debt securities. The payment of preferred stocks at a premium was permitted in one case on
the basis of an express finding that extinguishment of the stock, in
view of its investment quality (which is determined by the nature of
the issuing company's property and business, asset coverage, earnings
history, etc.), was not compelled by Section ii (b) and that, as a
consequence, extinguishment proposed by the management was a voluntary act.8 9 Subsequently the Commission expressed the more direct
view that the investment value of a specified preferred stock was such
that payment of the voluntary redemption price was fair, even though
the retirement of the stock was required by the Act. 90
The Commission has held that ordinarily the redemption price
constitutes the maximum that the issuing company can be allowed or
required to pay upon the retirement of a redeemable security. 91
The Commission has approved numerous plans under which
"premium" quality securities have been retired at a premium and
"marginal" securities have been retired without premium. 92 It has not
88. Id. at p. 23. Indeed, one issue of debentures involved in that case was not
callable until February, 1947, and the majority opinion strongly indicated that if they
were to be paid off prior to the earliest call date, more than iiO (the future redemption
price) would have to be paid. Subsequently, the Commission approved a plan filed by
the Company which provided for payment of the callable debentures at Iio plus accrued interest, and payment of the noncallable debentures at 1I5 plus accrued interest.
American Power & Light Co., SEC Holding Company Act Releases Nos. 6201, 6258
(1945).

89. United Gas Corp., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 5271 (1944) (the
first preferred stock "is a security which viewed apart from the context of the proposed
settlement and recapitalization might be left outstanding insofar as the requirements
of Section ii (b) (2) are concerned").

go. Buffalo, Niagara & Eastern Power Corp., SEC Holding Company Act Release
No. 6083 (1945).
gi. Ibid.; American Power & Light Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No.
6176 at p. 35 (1945).
92. Retirement at premium: United Gas Improvement Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 4173 (1943); North American Co., SEC Holding Company
Act Release No. 4565 (1943) ; United Public Utilities Corp., SEC Holding Company
Act Release No. 4625 (1943) ; Cities Service Power & Light Co., Durham Public
Service Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 4721 (1943); Pennsylvania
Power & Light Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 6167 (1945). It should
be noted that the Commission's Rule U-42 (b) exempts from specific approval
the retirement of a security "for the consideration specifically designated therein."
The Commission has indicated that it was considering the desirability of limiting the
exemption afforded by this rule. American Power & Light Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 6176 at p. 12 n. 1g (945). (Continued on p. 177.)
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yet passed upon any case involving the question whether a noncallable
preferred stock should be paid off at an amount above its voluntary
liquidation preference.
In this respect, a difference is to be noted between noncallable
debt and noncallable stock, for in the case of the latter there is usually
a provision for payment at a stated figure in the event of voluntary
liquidation. At present writing there is pending before the Commission
the question whether the noncallable 6% preferred stock of American
Light & Traction Company (a subholding company of Railways and
formerly of Power) may fairly be paid off, in the liquidation of
Traction, at its voluntary liquidation preference of $25 per share. Experts have submitted reports concluding that the fair value of this
preferred stock is in excess of $25 per share apart from the require93
ment of the Act that Traction be eliminated as a corporate entity.
This preferred stock is indisputably of premium quality in respect to
assets and earnings coverages and in view of its dividend history.
One of the experts, Edward Hopkinson, Jr., points out, however,
that in view of the governing state law permitting voluntary liquidation of the company by a vote of 66% 7 of the number of shares outstanding (without distinction as to class), the obvious benefits to be
gained by the common stockholders through voluntary liquidation, the
nature of the company's assets (consisting entirely of corporate securities), the nonfunctional nature of the company, and the concentration
of voting power in the hands of Railways (which has a predominantly
common-stock interest in Traction), there is a substantial likelihood
of voluntary liquidation apart from the Act. As a consequence, in his
Retirement without premium: North American Light & Power Co., ii S. E. C.
(1942), aff'd sub nom. City National Bank & Trust Co. v. SEC, 134 F. (2d) 65
(C. C. A. 7th, 1943); North Continent Utilities Corp., SEC Holding Company Act
Release No. 4686 (1943), plat enforced, 54 F. Supp. 527 (D. Del. 1944) ; Consolidated
Electric & Gas Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 4900 (1944), plan enforced, 55 F. Supp. 221 (D. Del. 1944); Cities Service Power & Light Co., SEC
Holding Company Act Release No. 4944 (I944); Laclede Gas Light Co., SEC Holding Company Act Releases Nos. 5o62, 5o71 (1944), plat; enforced, 57 F. Supp. 997 (E.
D. Mo. 1944), aff'd sub norn. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 15I F. (2d)
424 (C. C. A. 8th, 1945) ; Standard Gas & Electric Co., SEC Holding Company Act
Release No. 5430 (r944), the order of the District Court, which disapproved the plan,
59 F. Supp. 274 (D. Del. 1945), was reversed and remanded, 15I F. (2d) 326 (C. C. A.
3d, 1945) ; Consolidated Electric & Gas Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No.
5630 (1945).
Because of the provisions of Rule U-42 (b) the Commission has not yet had
occasion to pass upon the allocation to a premium security of an amount less than the
redemption premium and more than the principal amount or liquidation preference.
Theoretically the investment value of such security might lie somewhere betveen those
two amounts, though it might often be impractical to make a precise appraisal of such
intermediate value. It is not necessary that payment be made in cash, it being sufficient
that the otherwise equitable allocation be in the form of distribution of portfolio securities. This is so whether the securities being retired are debt securities (Standard
Gas & Electric Co. supra) or preferred stock (United Gas Improvement Co. supra).
93. United Light & Power Co., SEC Holding Company Act Releases Nos. 566i,
5840 (1945).
820
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opinion, the preferred stock must be valued at a lower figure than
would be the case if the issuer were an operating company less susceptible to voluntary liquidation. 4
(2) Treatment of "Submarginal" and Residual Securities
One of the most controversial questions under the "fair and
equitable" standard of Section ii (e) was resolved in connection with
the distribution of Power's assets among its preferred and common
stockholders. As we have seen, the Commission approved a plan of
Power's management allocating 95% of the assets to the preferred
stock as a class, and 50 thereof to the common stock as a class. 99
Commissioner Healy, being of the opinion that the preferred stock
was entitled to all the assets, dissented in an opinion that was used
by representatives of the preferred stock as the primary basis of their
opposition to the plan in the District Court, Circuit Court of Appeals,
and Supreme Court, in each case unsuccessfully. In the Supreme
Court the orders approving the plan were upheld by a vote of five to
three, Stone, Roberts, and Frankfurter, JJ., dissenting, and Douglas, J.
(formerly Chairman of the Commission) not participating."6
At the time the plan was filed, Power had been relieved of liability on its First Lien bonds and had paid off its debentures as outlined above. Thus it had no significant liabilities, and its only significant remaining asset was the entire issue of Railways common
stock. In order to eliminate Power from the holding-company system
pursuant to the Commission's liquidation order under Section ii (b),
(2) 9T it was necessary to dispose of the Railways' common stock and
eliminate Power's preferred and common stocks.
94. Report of Edward Hopkinson, Jr., File Nos. 59-17, 59-11, and 54-25, Application 21. Cf. El Paso Electric Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 5499
(I944), in which a premium quality preferred stock was permitted to be retired without redemption premium in view of similar legal and practical disabilities unrelated to
assets and earning coverages. It is our personal view that in the peculiar circumstances of that case the transaction effected was not a true liquidation within the meaning of El Paso's corporate charter and that the preferred stock should have received
more than the stated liquidation preference. Commissioner McConnaughey dissented
from the decision of the Commission partly on this ground.
95. A noncontroversial point which may be noted is that no difference was recognized between the non-voting Class A common stock and the voting Class B common
stock, the two groups being treated as a single class. The Commission had held that
no recognition could be given in reorganization to a junior security having no equity
in assets or prospective earnings of the issuing company merely because it possessed
practical voting control of the company and its underlying system. Such "unfair and
inequitable distribution of voting power" was determined to be in contravention of Section ii (b) (2), and cancellation of the valueless voting stock was required. Federal
Water Service Corp., 8 S. E. C. 893 (1941). See also Southern Colorado Power Co.,
SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 4501 (1943), plan enforced without opinion,
D. Colo. 1944, aff'd sub norn. Disman v. SEC, 147 F. (2d) 678 (C. C. A. Ioth, 1944),
cert. denied, 89 L. Ed. (Adv. Ops.) 116o (1945).
96. Plan approved and enforced, Application of SEC, 51 F. Supp. 217 (D. Del.
1943), aff'd rub nor. Otis & Co. v. SEC, 142 F. (2d) 411 (C. C. A. 3d, I944), aff'd,
323 U. S. 624 (945).

97. United Light & Power Co., 8 S. E. C. 837 (1941).

A DEATH SENTENCE OR A NEW LEASE ON LIFE?

Power's preferred stock was entitled to a cumulative preferential
dividend of $6 per share annually on 6oo,ooo shares, making the total
dividend requirements $3,600,000 annually. As shown by the tabulation set out above,98 however, Power's corporate net income before
dividend requirements had been very much less than this amount,
averaging less than $8oo,ooo per year in the period 1935 to 1939,

inclusive. Even the consolidated net income had averaged only slightly
more than $3,600,000 per year during the same period. As a result
of Power's inability to meet its current dividend requirements, large
arrears had accumulated and amounted to $38,700,ooo at the end of
1942. In comparison with the securities we have classified as "marginal," Power's preferred stock was of a distinctly "submarginal"
quality.
Power's certificate of incorporation provided that, in the event of
Power's involuntary liquidation, its preferred stockholders would be
entitled to receive $ioo per share plus an amount equal to all accumulated and accrued dividends thereon before the common stock could
receive anything. Thus, if the charter liquidation preference was operative the preferred stock was entitled to $98,700,000, or its equivalent
in securities, before the common could participate in the distribution.
On the evidence presented, the Commission found that the assets of
Power could not be fairly valued at an amount approaching $98,700,000.9

Power took the position that the charter liquidation preference
was not operative in the circumstances, and this was the principal question of law presented to the Commission. The only other question
was one of fact, or rather of financial analysis: if the charter preference
was not operative, what division of assets would give to each class
of stock the equitable equivalent of the rights it was called upon to
surrender?
In holding that the charter liquidation preference was not operative, the Commission first pointed out that liquidation pursuant to
Section ii (b), while doubtless "involuntary," was "of a type that
could not have been foreseen by the draftsmen of the corporate charter
or by investors in the stock, long before the enactment of the Holding
Company Act." It expressed the view that "involuntary liquidation,
in the context in which that term is used in the corporate charter,
98. Page i68 supra.
99. On the basis of testimony by an engineer retained by Power's management,
the over-all value of the assets was estimated by Power at $iio,oooooo as of April 30,
1942. The plan originally filed by Power proposed an allocation of 91% to the preferred stock and 9% to the common. The Commission specifically rejected this valuation and required modification of the allocation percentages. United Light & Power
Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 4215 at pp. 7, 19 (1943).
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connotes an act of default, either financially or in respect of conduct,
ol the part of the corporate management representing the common
stok. In short, it contemplates protection of the preferred stock from
business risks such as ordinarily attend equity investment .

,"

10

Secondly, the Commission posed the question "whether or not it would
be 'fair and equitable', in light of the legislative purpose and policy
underlying Section xi of the Act, to give controlling effect to that
charter provision under the circumstances." 101
The Commission stated that decisions like those in Case v. Los
Angeles Lumber Products Co. 10 2 and Northern Pacific Railway Co. v.

Boyd 103 were "predicated on sets of facts fundamentally distinguishable." Unlike bankruptcy and equity reorganizations brought about by
financial difficulties with creditors and where actual liquidation of the
enterprise is prohibited but new securities (in lieu of proceeds of sale)
are distributed to claimants as thoughs in liquidation,10 4 the Section ii
reorganization or liquidation is pursuant to a Congressional mandate
which operates even though the company affected may be in no financial difficulties with creditors. In the bankruptcy cases, claims are
treated as matured by the default or impending default of the debtor.
The Commission majority found no similar reason for the maturing
of the preferred stock claim in the case of Power, and determined that
the legislative policy was directly contrary to the maturing of such
claims. For, if the preferred stock's claim in respect of dividends were
matured, it would be translated from a right to receive dividends at
some time in the future, when and if earned by the company and declared by the board of directors, into an immediate and absolute claim
against the assets; and by this process the operation of Section ii
would impart greater value to the preferred stock at the expense of
the common, thus resulting in a windfall to the former class and a sacrifice of the legitimate investment value of the latter. 10 5
Ioo. Id. at p. 8 n. 12.

Ioi. Id. at pp. 7-8. (Italics supplied.)
102. 308 U. S. io6 (1939).
103. 228 U. S. 482 (1913).
104. Cf. Utilities Power & Light Corp., 5 S. E. C. 483 (1939), plan. approved, 29
F. Supp. 763 (N. D. Ill. 1939); Portland Electric Power Co., SEC Holding Company Act Releases No. 5132, 5470 (1944). In these cases, which came before the Commission under Section ii (f) and arose under the Bankruptcy Act, the liquidation
preferences of stockholders were treated as mature.
io5. United Light & Power Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 4215 at
pp. 9-12 (1943). Congressional Committee reports on the legislation expressed the
intention that the "technique worked out in the dissolutions under the Sherman Act
and the Hepburn Act (commodities clause)" (cf. Continental Insurance Co. v. United
States Reading Co., 259 U. S. 156 [1922]) be applied under Section il, to the end
that there shall be no "sacrifice of legitimate investment values." SEN. RE,. No. 621,
74 th Cong., Ist Sess. (1935) 13, 33. In this connection the Commission said:
"In the case before us, the duty to liquidate arises solely by virtue of a sovereign act, and in giving effect to the Congressional mandate we must not allow
the liquidation itself to add value to one class of securities at the expense of another class."

A DEATH SENTENCE OR A NEW LEASE ON LIFE?

The Commission fully recognized that the elimination of a corporate entity like Power could have been brought about for the purposes
of Section ii (b), by merger or consolidation as well as by liquidation, and that it was merely fortuitous that the means chosen for
Power was outright liquidation. In a previous case involving the
merger of a principal holding company with two others, the liquidation preferences of submarginal preferred stocks had been deemed to
be inapplicable in measuring the value of the claims of that class." 6
The same result had been reached in another proceeding where the
holding company had recapitalized by issuing new common stock in
exchange for its old preferred and common stocks, 1 7 and the Commission was in the process of considering the case of an operating
utility whose second preferred and common stocks were similarly to
be exchanged for new common stock, 0 s at rates that did not give effect
to the full liquidation claims provided by charter for the respective
preferred stocks. In those cases the decision was not so difficult to reach
because no distribution of assets in an apparent "liquidation" was involved. But should the form of the action required by Section i i (b)
or selected by the company be allowed to determine the substantive
rights of investors? The Commission took the view that:
". .. it should be immaterial whether the simplification process takes the form of a recapitalization, merger or distribution of
the assets of a holding company in liquidation. In other words,
the 'fair and equitable' standard requires the same recognition of
substantive rights irrespective of the method employed in a particular case for attaining the objectives of Section ii (b) (2)." 109
The Commission's conclusion on this phase of the case was that
it must "judge the fairness of the plan according to legitimate investment values existing apartfrom the duty of liquidationimposed by the
statute. The existence of the liquidation preference does, of course,
enter into the question as it is one of the bundle of rights belonging to
the preferred stock and affecting its normal value. The preference
itself, however, will not be permitted to operate so as to be conclusive
in the division of assets between the preferred and common stocks." 110
In view of this decision that the preferred stock's claim was not
governed by the operation of the charter liquidation preference, the
io6. Federal Water Service Corp., 8 S. E. C. 893 (1941).
1O7. Community Power & Light Co., 6 S. E. C. 182 (1939), plait approved and
enforced, 33 F. Supp. 9O1 (S. D. N. Y. 1940).
io8. Puget Sound Power & Light Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No.
4255 (943), plat approved and enforced without opnIonl, 49 F. SuPP. 54 (D. Mass.
1943).

lo9. United Light & Power Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 4215
at p.IO (1943).
io.Id. at p. 12.
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valuation technique commonly used in bankruptcy cases lost much of
its usefulness. The traditional procedure in such cases is to arrive
at an estimate of the future gross income to be derived from the productive assets of the enterprise, capitalize such estimated income at
an appropriate rate or rates (selected in the light of the known risk
factors involved in the particular businesses under consideration), and
thus reach an over-all valuation, subject to adjustment for any nonproductive assets and for working capital; then, the claims of creditors
and preferred stocks having matured and being of known amounts, the
amounts thereof are subtracted from the over-all valuation figure in the
order of their rank. In this way it can be determined whether a junior
security is entitled to any participation in the reorganized enterprise,
and if so, to what extent."1"
An over-all valuation of Power's assets could have been made in
the manner outlined, but this would be of little utility since the value
of the senior claim, which was the main sfibject of the inquiry, would
still be an unknown quantity and would have to be computed separately
in any event, either in terms of a dollar amount or in terms of a percentage of the underlying equity. The task of the Commission in these
circumstances, as in merger and recapitalization cases, was "to examine into the respective existing interests of the preferred and common
stockholders in the earnings of the enterprise as a going concern." 112
This it did by analyzing the earning power of Railways at length
in order to estimate the prospective income applicable to its common
stock. This involved looking into "the nature and condition of the
properties, the past earnings record, and all circumstances which indicate whether or not that record is a reliable criterion of future performance. .. ." "8 Its estimate of $6,I85,ooo as the prospective
average consolidated net income applicable to Railways' common stock,
admittedly a "very liberal assumption as to earning power," 14 reflected not only an improvement in operating revenues over prior years
iii. E. g., Portland Electric Power Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No.

5470 (1944) ; Utilities Power & Light Co., 5 S. E. C. 483 (1939), plan approved, 29

F. Supp. 763 (N. D. I1. 1939). When by reason of imminent debt maturities, the
amounts of the senior claims are determinable, the same technique may be used in a
reorganization under Section ni(e). Jacksonville Gas Co., ii S. E. C. 449 (1942),
plan enforced, 46 F. Supp. 852 (D. Fla. 1942).

112. Puget Sound Power & Light Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No.
4255 at p. 23 (1943).

There the Commission also said:

". .. in passing upon the fairness of the proposed plan, we believe it is unnecessary to arrive at any specific over-all value for Puget, because in the present
situation there are no claims to be treated as matured and thus no claims to be
measured against an over-all valuation figure."
113. Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U. S. 510, 526 (194).
114. United Light & Power Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 4215
at p. 18 (1943).
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but also a substantial amount of progress in reducing expenses and
income deductions by reason of the simplification of the system. 11
This estimate represented the average prospective annual income
in which Power's preferred and common stockholders had an interest. Since the figure exceeded the amount of Power's annual preferred
dividend requirements of $3,6oo,ooo by more than $2,500,000 per

year, on the basis of the estimate Power, if it remained in existence and
removed the obstacles that had earlier prevented the upward flow of
cash earnings, could expect to receive a substantial amount with which
to pay off its accumulated preferred dividend arrears over the course
of time. After that had been done the common stock would have an
interest in earnings of more than $2,5oo,ooo per year in perpetuity.

Since it is a cardinal principle of valuation that a claim for money
receivable at a future time has a lower present worth than a claim
against the same person for money immediately receivable, whatever
claim the preferred stock had for accumulated dividends and for future
annual dividends wa§ diminished according to the length of time that
would elapse before receipt of the dividends by the stockholders. Similarly, the value of the common stock's prospect of having $2,500,000
of applicable earnings per year was affected by the length of time that
would elapse before its interest in such earnings would begin. Both
classes were also affected by the risk that earnings of $6,I85,ooo might
not be fully realized, and by the chance that future earnings might exceed that amount.
Theoretically, it is possible for an analyst to estimate the present
worth of dividends receivable over a term of years by applying an
appropriate discount rate to the annual amounts receivable throughout
the term; and by this method the present worth of the preferred dividend arrears could be estimated, once it is known how long it would
take to pay them off. Also, it is theoretically possible to estimate the
present worth of dividends which are to begin at a known future time
and continue in perpetuity, by applying an appropriate capitalization
rate to the amount of such future dividends and then discounting the
resultant figure to present worth. Given the amounts receivable, the
proper discount rates and the term of years involved, this would be a
simple mathematical computation. But as a practical matter, no one
can claim the "clairvoyant percipience" 116 that would be necessary to
determine these factors with mathematical certitude, in view of the
numerous intangible factors to be considered. The Commission made
115. Incidentally, the figure estimated by the Commission in 1943 was about midway between the low and high pro forma 1944 earnings later submitted by the management of Railways in connection with its over-all simplification program. See note 72

supra.
ii6. See Stone, J., dissenting in Otis & Co. v. SEC, 323 U. S. 624, 642 (1945).
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no such claim, though it did estimate the prospective earnings (as it
was bound to do) for the purpose of determining the respective rights
of the two classes of stock in the enterprise as a going concern, and
then stated that on that basis "it would take approximately 15 years
for the preferred dividend arrearages to be paid in full, if all consolidated net earnings were to be applied toward the payment of current
and accumulated preferred dividends." 117 It did not find that this
would happen, but the hypothesis is enough to indicate that, absent
liquidation under Section i i, Power's preferred stock was not entitled
to all the future earnings of the enterprise in perpetuity but only for a
term of years in the reasonably foreseeable future, and that the common stock had a prospect, though a remote one, of receiving future
earnings. Under these conditions the Commission was unwilling fo
hold that the preferred stock should be given all the future interest in
Railways' common stock, to the total exclusion of Power's common.
It said:
"Our conclusion in this respect is of necessity one of over-all
judgment and not susceptible of mathematical demonstration. In
approaching the problem, we have kept in mind that there is always a margin of error inherent in any estimate of earning power.
Under all the circumstances it is our view that a participation for
the common stock of approximately 5%, while representing the
maximum, would not exceed the permissible limits of fairness. ..

.. " 118

In summary, Power's preferred, in giving up its preferential claims
to assets and earnings, was to receive 957o of the system's'net earnings
in perpetuity and would no longer be limited to $6 per share annually
plus the accumulated arrears; and by the same 'token, Power's common
stock was giving up 95%0 of its claim to the system's future net earnings in excess of $3,600,000 per year, beginning after preferred dividend arrears were fully paid.
Mathematical computations presented in the Commission's briefs
on appeal from the District Court's order approving the plan illustrate
how this works out in quantitative analysis. By the receipt of 5%0 of
the securities being distributed, Power's common stock (on the basis
of the estimated annual earnings of $6,185,000) gave up a ioo% interest in an estimated $2,585,000 annually beginning some fifteen years
at p.

117. United Light & Power Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 4215
X8 (1943).

118. Id. at p. 1g. Cf. Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U. S. 510,
526 (194): "Since its application [i. e. the criterion of prospective earning
power] requires a prediction of what will occur in the future, an estimate, as distinguished from mathematical certitude, is all that can be made. But that estimate must
be based on an informed judgment. ....

I
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in the future, in exchange for which it acquired a 5% interest in
annual earnings of $6,r85,ooo a year (or $309,250) to begin immediately. The ratio between $2,585,00o

and $309,250 is about 8.4 to I.

An annuity of $8.40 a year beginning fifteen years hence is mathematically equivalent to an annuity of $i.oo a year beginning at once if
the annuity of $8.40 a year is discounted to present value at the
rate of 15.2% per year. The discount rate of 15.2 %, a rate considered
in financial circles as recognizing a very high risk factor, is thus the
measure applied to the chance that earnings might not come up to
expectation. The chances that preferred dividend arrears might not
be fully paid in fifteen years is less important under the method outlined, because:
(a) to the extent that such period is lengthened, the present
worth of the preferred stock's claim (as well as that of the common
stock) is reduced, and the ratio between the preferred and common
stock participations is not greatly affected; and
(b) since both classes received Railways' common stock, any
net earnings not paid out in dividends would nevertheless tend to increase the equity of both groups of stockholders, and if the amounts
withheld were invested in revenue-producing properties the income
therefrom would tend to increase the future earnings to an amount in
excess of the estimate, or in any event to strengthen the estimate and
benefit Railways' common stock in the hands of both groups.1 19
The application of the 95%-5% ratio, though making no pretense to mathematical accuracy, is not a negation of the "absolute priorities" rule. This was emphasized by the Commission majority as
follows:
"It is pointed out in Commissioner Healy's separate opinion
that the words 'fair and equitable' embodied in Section i i have a
settled meaning, as determined by the courts, and that an application of the 'absolute priorities' doctrine must result in no distribution to Power's common stock in this case. But that is because
he measures the rights of the preferred stock as they would be
measured in bankruptcy cases, and not merely because he follows
the 'absolute priorities' doctrine in determining the consequences
of the measurement. In other words, we can agree with him when
he says that absolute prioritiesmust be respected, because we think
that doctrine simply means that the common stock must not be
accordedany participationunless the preferred stock has been fully
iip. This thought was expressed in Northern States Power Co., SEC Holding

Company Act Release No. 5745 at p. 23 (1945) : "Of course, to the extent that earnings were retained in the business they would tend to build up the equity of the Minnesota common stock distributed.

.

.

i86

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

compensated for its rights and priorities. But there the area of
agreement stops, because he says further that the rights and priorities of the preferred stockholders are the same here as in bankruptcy cases, where their claims to liquidation preferences (including dividend arrearages) are treated as matured. In our view it
would be unconscionable and contrary to the plain intention of
Congress to so hold." 120
This view was specifically sustained by the appellate courts. 2 1
The Commission has employed the techniques used in this case in
passing upon allocations between submarginal and residual stocks of a
large number of holding and operating companies, with variations to
meet the particular facts of each case. 1 22 It has not yet been called
120. United Light & Power Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 4215
at p. 12 (1943). (Italics supplied.)
121. it re SEC, 142 F. (2d) 411, 419-421 (C. C. A. 3d, 1944); Otis & Co. v.
SEC, 323 U. S. 624, 634-5 (1945). The Supreme Court's opinion, however, emphasizes

the point that the type of liquidation involved in this case could not possibly have
been foreseen at the time the charter preferences were drafted. See also, Note, Dodd,
Dissolution Preferencesand Public Utility Holding Company Act Simplifications-The
Otis Case (1945) 58 HAiv. L. REv. 604; Note (1945) 93 U. oF PA. L. REV. 308;
(1945) 33 GEo. L. J. 345; (1945) 13 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 372.
122. E. g., Northern States Power Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No.
5745 (945). In that case, which was decided after the decision of the Supreme Court
in the United Light & Power Company case, Commissioner Healy issued a separate
opinion concurring in the result upon the ground that the allocations could be approved
on a straight liquidation basis. He took the view that the Supreme Court, in holding
that the rights of Power's security holders must be judged as if Power were to be
continued as a "going concern," had followed the usual reorganization approach and
had not adopted a new test of measuring rights. In his view, the Court had not been
presented with, and had not decided, the question whether "a proper allocation might
have eliminated participation by [Power's] common stockholders." SEC Holding
Company Act Release No. 5745 at p. 49 (1945).
In Commonwealth & Southern Corp., SEC Holding Company Act Release No.
5825 (1945), the common stock again had an equity even on a liquidation basis, and
Commissioner Healy concurred in the result without opinion. Cases in which the
residual security could not have shared on a liquidation basis but were allowed to participate on the basis of earnings prospects include: Peoples Light & Power Co., SEC
Holding Company Act Releases Nos. 6ooo, 6054 (945) ; Georgia Power & Light Co.,
SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 5568 (1945) ; Standard Gas & Electric Co.,
SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 5430 (I944), the District Court's order disapproving the plan, 59 F. Supp. 274 (D. Del. 1945), being reversed on appeal, 151
F. (2d) 326 (C. C. A. 3d, 1945) ; Southern Colorado Power Co., SEC Holding Com-

pany Act Release No. 4501 (1943), plai enforced without opinion, D. Colo. 1944,
aff'd sub nora. Disman v. SEC, 147 F. (2d) 679 (C. C. A. ioth, 1945), cert. denied,
89 L. Ed. (Adv. Ops.) 116o (1945); Laclede Gas Light Co., SEC Holding Company Act Releases Nos. 5o62, 5071 (1944), plan enforced, 57 F. Supp. 997 (E. D. Mo.
1944), aff'd sub nora. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 151 F. (2d) 424 (C.
C. A. 8th, 1945) ; International Utilities Corp., SEC Holding Company Act Release
No. 4896 (1944); Virginia Public Service Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release
No. 4618 (943) ; Puget Sound Power & Light Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 4255 (943), plant enforced without opinion, 49 F. Supp. 54 (D. Mass.
1943). The Commission has followed the technique of valuing the entire bundle of
rights in the determination of the treatment to be accorded different series of the same
class of preferred stock having different dividend rates. Federal Water Service Corp.,
8 S.E. C. 893 (1941) ; Virginia Public Service Co., supra; Standard Gas & Electric
Co., supra; Northern States Power Co., supra; Minnesota Power & Light Co., SEC
Holding Company Act Release No. 5850 (1945).
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upon to determine whether similar treatment should be applied as between unmatured debt securities of submarginal quality and residual
securities having a reasonable prospect of sharing in future earnings.123
B. Litigation Claims, Defenses, and Compromises
As a step in its determination of the proper remedy to be applied
or of the fairness of a proposed simplification plan, the Commission
examines all intrasystem relationships, including claims based on security holdings and unliquidated claims raised by, against, or between
companies involved in the simplification proceedings.' 24 The Commission has considered that in order to determine whether proposed action meets the "fair and equitable" standard, it must inquire into the
validity and extent of such claims and the defenses thereto. 12 5 The
most important questions relating to such claims have centered around
the equitable principles governing abuse of the parent-subsidiary relationship which were developed in Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric
Company (the Deep Rock case).120 In that case, a corporate reorganization proceeding under Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act, a parent
company's claims based upon notes of its subsidiary held by it were
subordinated to publicly held preferred stock. The Court's action, the
effect of which was to deprive the parent of participation as a creditor
of its subsidiary, was based on the finding that the parent had used
its power of control, exercised by virtue of its ioo% common stock
ownership, to mismanage and spoliate the subsidiary: the parent had
organized the subsidiary with inadequate equity capital, had caused
the subsidiary to give it securities in the form of debt obligations for
funds advanced when equity capital was needed, had pursued harmful
dividend policies in order to preserve its control, and had placed upon
123. As we have noted at p. 175 supra, a majority of the Commission has indicated
that there may be a minimum of 100o% for the retirement of debt by a solvent company. American Power & Light Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 6176 at
p. 11 (1945). Under certain circumstances, however, it might be argued persuasively
that debt whose maturity is far off at the time of the reorganization should be discounted at a higher rate of interest than the contract rate of interest, and that allocation of less than principal amount would be equitable. Indeed, Commissioner Healy
in his dissent pointed out that this would be a logical consequence of the majority's
decision in the American Power & Light Co. case. Id. at p. 39.
124. Section ii (a) of the Act directs the Commission to "examine the corporate
structure of every registered holding company and subsidiary company thereof, the relationships among the companies in the holding-company system of every such company
and the character of the interests thereof ...
"
49 STAT. 820 (1935), 15 U. S. C.
§79k (a) (1941).
125. North American Light & Power Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release
No. 4066 (1943); New England Gas & Electric Ass'n, SEC Holding Company Act
Release No. 4158 (1943).
126. 3o6 U. S. 307 (939).

See also Pepper v. Litton, 308 U. S. 295, 308 (1939) Columbia Gas & Electric Corp. v. United States (C. C. A. 6th, October 9, 1945).
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the subsidiary undue business risks from which the parent stood to
27
profit.'
The Commission has undertaken to give most careful consideration to the important, difficult, and novel questions of law and fact
relating to alleged corporate mismanagement in the cases with which
it deals. Where the questions arise in proceedings before the Commission under Section ii (b) (2) or II (e), the staff of the Commission participates actively in a full inquiry into the intercompany
claims.' 2 8 Where one or more of the companies is in bankruptcy reorganization and an examination of intercompany claims takes place
under the auspices of the court, the Commission's representatives have
actively participated in the court proceedings and aided in the exploration of the claims 129 as part of its function in Chapter X proceedings
generally. 130 From the exploration of intrasystem claims has come a
clarification of the relative rights of the classes of security holders affected, which has led to disposition of the claims by compromises and
other means. In some cases contributions by parent companies as a
step in the retirement of their subsidiaries' publicly held securities, and
the consequent elimination of the controversies relating to the intrasystem claims, have been approved by the Commission.'

31

In a number

of other cases compromises, in the form of parent contributions or
127. For discussions of the "Deep Rock" doctrine, see Israels, The Implications

and Limitations of the "Deep Rock" Doctrine (1942) 42 COL. L. RFv. 376; Krotinger,
The "Deep Rock" Doctrine: A Realistic Approach to Parent-SubsidiaryLaw (1942)
42 COL. L. REv. 1124; Sprecher, The Conflict of Equities Under the "Deep Rock"
Doctrine (1943)

43 COL. L. REV. 336.

128. The Public Utilities Division carries the main burden of discovering and

asserting intercompany claims where public security holders of the interested companies are not actively represented in the proceedings before the Commission.- It is
natural enough that managements of subsidiaries which are either identified with or
under the control of the potential defendants do not often assert such claims themselves.
In one interesting case, however, the management of an operating subsidiary has filed
very substantial claims on behalf of the company against its parent holding companies.
Recently, prior to a determination of the claims, this subsidiary petitioned the Commission to order the parent companies not to exercise their voting power for the purpose of electing new directors to the subsidiary's board of directors. The Commission
granted the petition, stating that it could not see how the directors and management
of the subsidiary "can engage in a frank discussion of its plans for prosecuting claims
and developing evidence or for trading out a compromise . . . in the presence of
directors chosen by" the parent companies. North American Light & Power Co., SEC
Holding Company Act Release No. 6153 at p. IO (1945).
129.

See In re Commonwealth Light & Power Co., 141 F. (2d) 734 (C. C. A. 7th,

1944) ; In re American Fuel & Power Co., 122 F. (2d) 223 (C. C. A. 6th, 1941). Cf.
Ip re Central States Electric Corp., 143 F. (2d) 684 (C. C. A. 4 th, 1944) where the

Commission joined in urging full investigation of claims asserted by public security
holders against a parent company.
13o. See Section 2o8 of the Bankruptcy Act, as amended, 52 STAT. 894 (1938), 11
U. S. C. § 6o8 (1940).
131. Florida Power & Light Co., SEC Holding Company Act Releases Nos. 2874
(I94), 4791 (1943); Cities Service Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No.
4944 (1944).

A DEATH SENTENCE OR A NEW LEASE ON LIFE?

reduction or partial subordination of contested claims, have been embodied in plans submitted pursuant to Sections ii (e) and ii (f).
Such plans have beerl approved by the Commission where it has found
the compromises fell within the range of fair adjustment of the rights
of the contesting classes of security holders. 1 32 In one case where the
Commission considered that the proposed compromise incorporated in
a reorganization plan filed pursuant to Section ii (f) did not accord
adequate recognition to certain of the claims in litigation, it made its
approval of the plan conditional upon a modification of the plan giving
an increased participation to such claims. 13 3 In such cases, the compromise allocations among various contestants are necessarily judged
on the basis of the relative litigation strengths that appear from the
factual and legal issues raised.
A striking illustration of the unusual forms which alleged intercorporate mismanagement and abuse can take is afforded in the case of
the joint reorganization of Associated Gas and Electric Company
("Ageco") and its subholding company, Associated Gas and Electric
Corporation ("Agecorp") .134 The factual background of the claims in
that case is worth summarizing briefly.
Ageco and Agecorp, and the complex system of corporations under
them, were dominated by Howard C. Hopson who controlled and
directed the financial, corporate, and accounting policies of the entire
Associated system. Most of the important officials of Ageco and its
subsidiaries received their salaries not from those companies but from
132. Section ii (e) plans: North Shore Gas Co., io S. E. C. 504, 533 (1941) ;
Columbia Gas & Electric Corp., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 3885 (942),
aff'd sub voin. Marquis & Co. v. SEC, 134 F. (2d) 822 (C. C. A. 3d, 1943), plan enforced, Application of SEC, 5o F. Supp. 965 (D. Del. 1943) ; Virginia Public Service
Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 4618 (943) ; Utilities Employees Securities Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 4492 (1943); Derby Gas & Electric Co., 9 S. E. C. 686, 702 (941) ; United Gas Corp., SEC Holding Company Act
Release No. 5271 (1944), plait enforced, In re United Gas Corp., 58 F. Supp.
501 (D. Del. 1944) ; General Gas & Electric Corp., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 5950 (945) ; Standard Power & Light Corp., SEC Holding Company Act
Release No. 5625 (1945) ; Spokane Gas & Fuel Co., SEC Holding Company Act Re-

lease No. 6o65 (1945).

Plans filed pursuant to Section ii (f) : Mountain States Power Co., 5 S. E. C. i
(1939) ; Stanley Clarke, Trustee of Associated Gas & Electric Co., SEC Holding
Company Act Release No. 4985 (1944), plait approved, 61 F. Supp. II (S. D. N. Y.
1944), aff'd, 149 F. (2d) 996 (C. C. A. 2d, 1045), cert. denied, 89 L. Ed. (Adv. Ops.) 42
(1945) ; Morris, Trustee of the Estate of Midland United Co., SEC Holding Company
Act Releases Nos. 5317, 5317A ('944), plan approved, 58 F. Supp. 667 (D. Del. 1944) ;
Dwyer, Trustee of the Estate of Inland Power & Light Corp., SEC Holding Company
Act Release No. 5369 (1944).
133. Morris, Trustee of the Estate of Midland United Co., SEC Holding Company Act Releases Nos. 5317, 5317A (1944), plait approved, 58 F. Supp. 667 (D. Del.

1944).

134. Clarke, Trustee of Associated Gas & Electric Co., SEC Holding Company
Act Release No. 4985 (1944), plan approved, 61 F. Supp. 1I (S. D. N. Y. I944),
aff'd, 149 F. (2d) 996 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945), cert. denied, 89 L. Ed. (Adv. Ops.) 42
(945).
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"service companies" owned by Hopson and his family, and most of the
directors were employees of such service companies and had given
Hopson their signed, undated resignations. Transactions were made
under his direction and were recorded in the manner which he desired,
books of record being commonly kept in loose leaf form and entries
were often predated, post-dated, changed, or revised at his instruction.
Under his guiding hand the Associated system expanded phenomenally,
properties and security acquisitions being effected largely through the
issuance of Ageco securities of many kinds having a wide variety of
different and often unique contract provisions. As new security holdings were acquired by the system, nominal ownership was placed in
the name of a partnership consisting of employees of the Hopson service companies, without indicating what company had beneficial ownership of the securities. The records, kept under Hopson's personal control, purported to record the beneficial ownership and transfers thereof
but entries were irregularly maintained and revised from time to time.
When beneficial ownership of the securities was transferred to particular
subholding companies it was generally recorded that such companies
were indebted to Ageco in the amount of the value of the securities
transferred. Such indebtedness was, under Hopson's direction, changed
to stock subscriptions and back to debt on a number of occasions.
In 1932, Ageco and certain of its subsidiaries were faced with
large debt maturities which could not be met out of available funds.
Although Ageco had outstanding a large amount of debentures which
contained covenants against mortgage or pledge of the company's assets without ratably securing the debentures, Ageco attempted to issue
bonds which were to have priority over all Ageco obligations and
were to be guaranteed as to principal and interest by Agecorp. Further, all indebtedness owing by Agecorp to Ageco was to be subordinated to Agecorp's guaranty. When counsel for the bank which was
to act as indenture trustee for the new bonds inquired as to the amount
of Agecorp's debt to Ageco, Ageco's counsel said that it was about
$5,000,000.

On further inquiry it was said to be $5o,ooo,ooo, then

$ioo,ooo,ooo. Finally it was admitted to be nearly $6oo,ooo,ooo, although no mention was made of any particular form which this debt
took.
Shortly thereafter, Hopson personally went to Ageco's safe deposit vault, although such visits by him were not in the usual course
of business, and removed some securities. They were apparently returned four days later, and after that it appeared that the indebtedness
of Agecorp to Ageco, totaling $665,200,000 was in the form of notes

convertible into the stock of the obligor at the option of the obligor,

A DEATH SENTENCE OR A NEW LEASE ON LIFE?

and also that they were subordinate to other obligations of Agecorp in
the event of its bankruptcy or insolvency prior to conversion.
Thus the debt of Agecorp to Ageco, which had been referred to
merely as "debt" or "notes" in the previous discussions, now appeared
as subordinate obligations with a novel conversion feature. This obviously made a great difference to the debenture holders of Ageco in
the event Agecorp issued obligations of its own, and in fact, Agecorp
proceeded immediately to do so. Under the direction of Hopson, Agecorp also elected to convert about $6oo,ooo,ooo of the notes into shares
of its own common stock (all of which was owned by Ageco anyway).
In addition to these steps, Hopson sought to alleviate Ageco's
financial difficulties by reducing or eliminating its debentures which had
the negative-pledge covenant and which bore fixed interest. In a socalled "Recap Plan" he caused the holders of such debentures to be
offered the right to exchange those debentures for debentures of Agecorp having either a smaller face amount, or bearing interest only if
earned by Agecorp, or debentures of Ageco having both a lower interest rate and bearing interest only if earned. Contemporaneous attempts to enjoin the carrying out of this plan were either unsuccessful
or not pursued to a conclusion, and by an intensive solicitation campaign Ageco succeeded in inducing a considerable number of exchanges.
In 194o, both Ageco and Agecorp went into reorganization proceedings under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act. At that time Agecorp's publicly held obligations substantially exceeded the value of its
assets. Ageco's principal assets consisted of Agecorp common stock
and some alleged subordinate debt of Agecorp. Thus, if recorded rights
and priorities were to be followed, the holders of Ageco's debt securities,
aggregating about $iI8,ooo,ooo in principal amount, would receive
little or nothing. The trustee for Ageco accordingly brought suit
against the trustees for Agecorp attacking the recorded ownership of
assets, the validity of the "Recap Plan," and the apparent priorities of
the Agecorp securities. Holders of Ageco securities also litigated various claims. The record on these litigations produced "a mass of incredibly complex legal, equitable and factual contentions, defenses and crossclaims putting into issue the relative positions of practically every class
of securities of both estates against other classes and posing many important and novel questions in the law of corporations, creditors' rights,
bankruptcy and corporate reorganization." 135
Many of the issues had strong arguments on both sides, and the
trustees of both estates recognized that an ultimate adjudication might
properly take the form of a broad equitable resolution of the many al135. SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 4985 at p. 4 (1944).

192

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

leged frauds and irregularities. Accordingly, after discussions with
representatives of various groups of security holders, the trustees devised a "Recap Compromise," the main feature of which was that the
estates of the two debtors were to be treated practically as one, and that
the debentures and certain other obligations of Ageco could be treated
as of equal rank with the Agecorp debentures, subject to differentials as
to the dollar amounts of claims to be allowed against the joint assets.
The compromise formed the basic feature of a plan of reorganization filed by the trustees with the Commission pursuant to Section
i i (f) of the Act. After a full examination of all the facts and issues,
the Commission concluded that the proposed parity, with the submitted differentials, had "a sound and rational basis meeting the requirements of equity arising out of the confused situation in which the
two debtors and their respective creditors have been placed by the actions of a common management prior to bankruptcy." It further
found that the various differentials compensated "each participating
class and group in the light of its claims and litigation strength in relation to the claims and litigation strength of each other class and group,
without exact measurement of each (which is impossible under the circumstances) but by practical adjustments which fall well within a
permissible range of fairness and equity, having due regard to the
benefits to be derived by all from the prompt termination of litigation." 136 After the Commission approved the plan for submission to
the court, the court gave its approval and its order was sustained on
appeal.
The Commission's jurisdiction with regard to intercompany
claims has been hailed both as affording an adequate forum for the
satisfactory investigation and recognition of claims of relatively disorganized classes of investors against holding companies subject to Section ii, and as serving as a model for the extension of much-needed
37
remedies to stockholders generally.1
Another power of the Commission incidental to its function to
effect system simplification is the protection of its processes against
misuse by corporate insiders. Under the Act, the control exercised by
the existing holding-company management is not disturbed by the initiation or pendency of the simplification proceedings. The corporate
managers retain a position which enables them to carry on advance discussions with the Commission's staff regarding possible simplification
steps and plans and to exercise considerable control over their formulation, proposal, and consummation. It is clear, however, that Congress
136. Id. at p. 47.
137. See F-ornstein A New Forum for Stockholders (1945) 45 COL. L. REV. 35.

A DEATH SENTENCE OR A NEW LEASE ON LIFE?

did not intend that such retention of control and the perquisites of control should be used for self-advantage at the expense of public investors, 138 and the Commission has scrutinized transactions by corporate

managers so as to insure that this should not result.
In the case of Federal Water Service Co., 139 shares of preferred

stock of a company being reorganized under Section I I were acquired
by members of the management during the pendency of the proceedings.
The stock was heavily in arrears as to dividends, was to be replaced in
the reorganization by new common stock carrying voting control of
the system, and the shares were acquired by members of the management partly for the purpose of maintaining themselves in office through
the voting power to be obtained from the reorganization. The Commission viewed the members of the management as reorganization
managers having fiduciary obligations to all security holders, and held
that their program of buying preferred stock in the course of the reorganization placed their personal interests in conflict with those of the
public security holders they were supposed to represent. The Commission said it could not find it fair and equitable to permit the management to profit from the reorganization under these conditions, and
limited their participation to the amount of the consideration paid for
the shares plus interest at 4%. In that case the Commission also indicated that it would apply the same equitable considerations to profits
by reorganization managers from purchases made prior to but in con40
templation of the institution of simplification steps or proceedings.'
C. Adjustments Proposed for Individual Acceptance
In the preceding discussion of the "fair and equitable" standard
we have dealt with the fairness of treatment provided for security holders irrespective of their individual consent. Another type of treatment
gives security holders individually the option of accepting or rejecting
offers of purchase or exchange. Where the offeror is a company subject to the Commission's jurisdiction under Section Ii, and an offer
to purchase or exchange outstanding securities constitutes part of the
138. The Report of the National Power Policy Committee, which served as a
blue print for the Act, recommended that ". . . it seems administratively advisable
that every opportunity be offered the owners of holding company securities to work
out their own process of dismantling. That opportunity should, of course, be vigilantly guarded to protect the average investor from the exploitation threatened him
almost as a matter of course under our usual methods and mores of corporate reorganization. . . ." Appendix to SE:N. REP. No. 621, 74th Cong., ist Sess. (1935) on
S. 2796 at p. 58.
139. 8 S. E. C. 893 (1941), 10 S. E. C. 200 (1941), rev'd in part sub nora.
Chenery Corp. v. SEC, 128 F. (2d) 303 (App. D. C. i942), remanded Msb nora. SEC
v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80 (1943), redetermined, SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 5584 (I945), petition for review pending.
140. See SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 5584 at p. 25 (1945).
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company's program of compliance with Section i i (b), such offer must
meet the "fair and equitable" standard as though it were part of a plan
under Section i i (e). 41
In determining the fairness of proposed offers of this nature,
greater latitude is allowed than in cases where the security holder has
no choice, but the Commission holds the view that the choice offered-to
the security holder must present reasonable alternatives. The first
expression of this view appears in a case under Section ii (f) in
which the Commission approved a plan of reorganization wherein the
debtor offered creditors a choice between new preferred and new common stock for a portion of their claims. The Commission said:
"The choice as between the alternatives, in our opinion,
offers merely a question of investment judgment which calls for no
further comment from us."
And to this was appended the following footnote:
"We do not mean to suggest that we would approve the submission to security holders of an alternative which was plainly
unfair and might be misleading. Such is not the case here." 142
This approach represented a development beyond that taken by
the Commission in previous holdings made in the course of related
proceedings, in which a wholly-owned subsidiary of the debtor applied
to the Commission for approval of an offer to purchase outstanding
debentures of the debtor, with two years' interest coupons attached, at
70% of the debentures' principal amount. The applicant was to use
cash in the amount of $12,000,000 or more for such purpose. The
main issues argued before the Commission were whether the proposed purchases would give a preference to debenture holders availing
themselves of the offer, and whether the expenditure of so much cash
would undermine the ability of the system to conduct its utility operations. The Commission answered both these questions in the negative
and granted the application (subject to conditions) on the basis of evidence which included an appraisal of the minimum intrinsic value of
the debtor's assets, saying:
"On the basis of the record in this proceeding, and solely for
the purposes thereof, it appears that creditors' claims are covered to
the minimum extent of approximately 93 percent. ...
"The saving [to be effected by purchases at 70], it appears
from the evidence, will tend to protect the debtor from possible
141. Engineers Public Service Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 4114
(1943).

142. Utilities Power & Light Corp., 5 S. E. C. 483, 504 (1939).
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insolvency, and would have the further effect of providing pro
tanto asset coverage for the junior securities. In this fashion then,
it appears clearly to be in the interest of junior security holders.
"The conclusion follows, therefore, that the consummation of
the proposed transactionis in the interest of all investors who will
be affected by it." 143

The only statement relating to the fairness of the price from the viewpoint of the debenture holders was in the form of a finding that the
4
market quotations for the debentures were currently lower than 70.1 4
Later, the problem presented in this type of case was reviewed at
length in the case of Engineers Public Service Company ("Engineers"), which sought the Commission's approval of a program of preferred stock purchases in the open market for which it would use about
$2,150,000 of the cash proceeds realized from the sale of a subsidiary.
The sale had been made pursuant to the requirements of Section i i (b)
(I).
Engineers had no debt outstanding, but had three series of preferred stock with involuntary liquidation preferences totaling some
$41,800,000 plus accrued dividends. Current earnings exceeded current dividend requirements, no dividends were in arrears, and there
was uncontroverted evidence in the record that the assets of Engineers
were fairly worth somewhat more than the involuntary liquidation
preference of $ioo per share. The market quotations for the stock,
however, ranged from the low 6os to the low 70s for the several series.
Engineers was contemplating the disposal of a considerable portion of its assets pursuant to Section ii (b) (i) and, as a corollary
to the reduction of assets, it had tentative plans for reducing the
amount of its preferred stock by about 4o%. The Commission, holding that the application before it was a step in the over-all program of
simplification under Section ii, stated that it was unable to find the
proposal fair and equitable in the absence of a comprehensive plan,
since the "fair and equitable" standard requires "at a minimum . . .
that some reasonable relation be shown to exist between the prices at
which it is proposed to acquire shares of preferred stock and the treat143. Utilities Power & Light Corp., Ltd., 4 S. E. C. 131, 141, 142 (1938).

(Italics

supplied.)

144. Id. at 137. See also Utilities Power & Light Corp., Ltd., 5 S. E. C. 13 (1939).

It later turned out that the debentures which were not tendered for purchase were
covered more than ioo% as to principal and interest, and that the debtor's preferred
stock had a substantial*equity, unquestionably derived from the differential between the
price paid on the debenture purchases and the asset values underlying the debentures.
Utilities Power & Light Corp., Ltd., 4 S. E. C. 131, 142 (1938).
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ment which might reasonably be expected to be accorded to them under
a comprehensive plan."' 45
The Commission did not base its decision specifically on a finding
that the Engineers preferred stock was being traded in the market at
a disproportionately large discount from its fair value-as it might well
do in a similar case today in view of its recent holding in the American
Power & Light Company case.1 46 This would appear to have been a
turning point in the decision, however, because when market prices of
the Engineers preferred stock later had advanced to a range between
95 and IOI for the several series, the Commission permitted a repurchase program to be instituted by the company, saying:
". .. the current market prices of the three series of preferred
stocks which Engineers now proposes to reacquire [by purchases
in.the market] are close to the involuntary liquidating prices and
under the circumstances we are satisfied that the proposed reacquisition is not unfair to the security holders of Engineers." 147
A similar test appears to have been applied in numerous cases involving repurchases of debt securities priced within a narrow range of
the principal amount or redemption price.' 48 An exception was made
in the case of a company which was about to liquidate and which desired to purchase its own bonds at a discount. Its assets consisted entirely of Associated Gas and Electric securities, which were subjects
of litigation in the reorganization proceedings for Ageco and Agecorp
outlined above, and could not be evaluated on the basis of financial
analysis. The market values of these assets had been fluctuating
sharply, and it was highly uncertain whether they afforded full coverage for the principal amount of the bonds sought to be repurchased.
49
Repurchase of the bonds was not permitted.1

145. Engineers Public Service Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 4114
at p. IO (1943). Contrast this with Electric Bond & Share Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 44oo (1943) where the Commission found that the Company
was not in a position to file a comprehensive plan under Section ii (e) and that the
repurchase program thus was not subject to the "fair and equitable" standard. And
cf. Electric Bond & Share Co., io S. E. C. 2206 (1942). Recently the Company

proposed and the Commission approved a plan for distribution of $3o,ooo,ooo among the

preferred stockholders as a partial compliance with a requirement that the preferred
stock be eliminated under Section ii (b) (2). Electric Bond & Share Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 6121 (1945).
146, SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 6176 (I945) discussed at p. 176
supra.
147. Engineers Public Service Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release' No. 4997
at p. 6 (1944).
148. For example, Columbia Gas & Electric Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 36oo (1942); Electric Power & Light Corp., SEC Holding Company Act
Release No. 3644 (943); American Power & LightCo., SEC Holding Company Act
Release No. 4133 (1943); Consolidated Electric & Gas Co., SEC Holding Company
Act Releases Nos. 4900, 5421 (1944).
149. Associated General Utilities Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No.
5133 (1944).

A DEATH SENTENCE OR A NEW LEASE ON LIFE?

97

Occasionally repurchase upon the company's invitation for tenders by individual security holders has been permitted, 150 but that method
has not been favored, 1 1 presumably because it puts too much of a
burden upon the security holders who would have to name the price at
which they were willing to tender their securities, often without sufficient facts or a reliable market to guide them. 15 2 The company may
be permitted to purchase its own securities in private transactions off
the exchange, but may not solicit for that purpose.' 53
A variant of the private purchase method is the exchange offer, in
which portfolio securities of a company are offered in exchange for
outstanding securities, at fixed rates of exchange, for acceptance or
rejection by the company's security holders. By this process assets
which may not be retained under Section ii (b) (i) are sometimes
divested at the same time that senior securities are reduced or eliminated as required by Section ii (b) (2).
An interesting illustration of this is afforded by the United Corporation ("United"), whih thus divested itself of Philadelphia Electric Company ("PE") common stock and reduced its own burdensome
preferred stock structure simultaneously. PE common stock had come
to United as a dividend in partial liquidation of The United Gas
Improvement Company, a subsidiary of United. 4 Its retention by
United was inconsistent with the requirements of Section ii (b) (i),
and the preference stock of United had been ordered eliminated pursuant to the requirements of Section i (b) (2).'55 As a step toward
solution of its problems under both sections United proposed to offer
the PE common stock, together with cash, in exchange for shares of
its outstanding preference stock.
The preference stock was entitled to cumulative dividends of $3
per year, and was $5.25 per share in arrears at the time. Its liquidation
preference was $50 per share plus dividend arrears. Dividends were
covered by earnings 1.58 times, and the asset coverage was $48.89 per
share based on the indicated market value of portfolio securities. The
preference stock was quoted on the market, however, at about 36%.
i5o. El Paso Electric Co. (Delaware), 8 S. E. C. 366

(1940)

; Electric Power &

Light Corp., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 5740 (1944).

151. See Electric Bond & Share Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 4400

at p. 5 (943)

:

".

.

.

the company's declaration does not provide for tenders, pre-

sumably because of the many objections to that method that have been raised in the
past. . . ..
152.

See, e. g., Utilities Power & Light Corp., Ltd., 4 S. E. C.

13,

136 n. 6

(i938).
153. See Electric Bond & Share Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No.

4400 (93).
154. United Gas Improvement Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 4173

(1943).
i55. United Corp., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 4478

(943).
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The exchange offer approved by the Commission was at the rate
of 1.8 shares of PE common and $6 in cash for each share of United's
preference stock surrendered for exchange, the offer being limited as
there was enough PE common to retire only 45% of the United
preference stock on this basis. The "package" of PE common stock
and cash thus offered was found by the Commission to have a value
of from $53 to $6o based on a capitalization of prospective income,
and it had a ready market value of about 41, or nearly 5 points above
the market price of United's preference stock. This offer seemed
clearly to be fair to the stockholders who accepted. But what about
United's preference stockholders who did not choose, or were not able
because of the limited nature of the offer, to accept, and its common
stockholders who were given no choice?
The Commission found the proposal fair and equitable to the
latter by reason of the resulting increase in earnings and asset coverages of the remaining preference and common stocks. As a result of
the exchanges, the earnings coverage of the unexchanged preference
stock rose from 1.58 to 1.87 times dividend requirements, and the
asset coverage of such stock rose from $48.89 to $56.12 per share.
The net asset value of the common stock was converted, as a result of
the exchange offer, from a deficit of $1.o9 per share to an equity of
about eight cents per share. Its applicable earnings were also greater
to the extent that the earnings coverage of the preferred dividend was
increased."

6

V. CONCLUSIONS

In summary, one of the primary functions of the Commission
under Section ii has been to eliminate or reduce the leverage feature
in equity securities of holding-company systems, to bring sound equity
securities out of system portfolios into the public markets in place of
the relatively weak and speculative securities of the holding companies
themselves, and to do this on a fair basis that will improve and not
destroy legitimate investment values. The Commission, would not be
human if it had made no errors along the way; but the evidence of
market appraisal and of financial analysts leads to the conclusion that
its efforts have so far been highly successful.
These efforts of the Commission have undoubtedly been aided in
the past few years by rising markets for equity securities. It is mani156. United Corp., SEC Holding Company Act Release No. 544o (1944). Subsequently, another similar exchange offer was made by United, using cash and the
common stock of another subsidiary, Delaware Power & Light Company, to retire an
additional 11% of the preference stock. United Corp., SEC Holding Company Act
Release No. 5812 (1945). For other examples, see National Power & Light Co., IO
S. E. C. 827 (194) ; Standard Gas & Electric Co., 7 S. E. C. 1089 (1940).
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festly impossible to segregate the benefits attributable to the operation
of Section II, in terms of dollars, from the rise in market prices due to
other factors. Nevertheless, it is demonstrable that the equity securities of holding companies in general have long been traded at a discount from the market values of their underlying portfolios, which
means that investors in general value the direct ownership of portfolio
securities more highly than indirect interests in the same securities; 157
and as a consequence, the market value of holding-company securities
has tended to increase whenever liquidation or partial liquidation of the
portfolio has appeared to be drawing near. This was illustrated to
some extent in the United Corporation distribution just discussed. A
few other illustrations may be of interest.
Just before Power filed its plan providing for distribution of Railways' common stock on a 91 o-97%basis, Power's preferred stock was
being traded on the New York Curb at between 17 and 22, and the
common stock at around Y. During the hearings on the plan in 1942
these prices went to 35 for the preferred and 2 for the common, and
in April 1943, immediately following the Commission's announcement
of its decision approving the 95 %-5 7 allocation, the preferred jumped
to 43. These stocks were replaced on the Exchange by the common
stock of Railways in April 1945, when they were last quoted at 75 and
at Y4, respectively; and currently, the average market price of the
Railways common stock (about 27) gives the former stocks of Power
an equivalent market value of 135 for the preferred and nearly Iys for
the common.
Similarly, the common stock of The United Gas Improvement
Company rose at the prospect of receiving liquidating dividends in
stock of Philadelphia Electric Company and Public Service Company
of New Jersey, moving from 4 at the time the plan was filed, to 6
immediately after the filing, to 9?/8 at the time of the distribution.
The same reaction is to be noted in the case of operating company
stocks which are undergoing the strengthening process of simplification.: 58 For example, just before the recapitalization plan of Southern
Colorado Power Company was filed, its preferred stock was traded at
about 32; after the Commission's approval of the plan, the price rose
to 6o; and by the time the District Court directed enforcement of the
plan, the price was up to 70.
157. The same tendency is discernible with respect to investment companies whose
securities have a public market. See the Commission's findings in Shawnut Ass'n,
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3564 at pp. 6-9 (1944).
i58. The present Director of the Public Utilities Division of the Commission has
recently dealt with this aspect of the rehabilitation process. Cohen, How the Securities and Exchange Commission Operates Under the Holding Company Act (1945) 23
ELEcraRc LIGAT AM PowM, No. 6, p. 84.
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These are not isolated instances, nor have we chosen the most
impressive examples.

Between the end of 1935 and June 30, 1944,

holding companies divested themselves of 266 companies with assets of
over 33/4 billion dollars,'- 9 so that there has been ample opportunity for
qualified observers to weigh the evidence. One financial paper has described the results as follows:
"... there is no denying that [SEC policy] has helped investors
by improving the financial status of many subsidiaries of utility
holding companies. Not only have depreciation allowances been
increased, but fixed debts have been reduced and property accounts
have been cleaned up as a result of the SEC orders. Th resulting
improved financial status of subsidiaries has no doubt helped considerably in practically terminating the public ownership movement in the electric industry." 160
Another periodical predicted this course in 1941, and 'has commented thus while the process was under way:
"The prospect of disintegration of holding companies suggests higher prices for a number of senior securities. The break
up of properties will, in many instances, afford higher property
values. Then, too, the very prospect of substituting actual possession for a mere right to certain assets will have the effect of
making these assets more valuable. This will be especially true
of those holding company bonds and preferred stocks selling at
substantial discounts from their asset values." 161
"For the most part, holding company preferreds continue to
sell at a discount from estimated liquidating values. As further
progress is made in completing integration, simplification or liquidation plans, this value differential should narrow or disappear.
Moreover, because the outlook for operating company equities is
good, improvement in investor confidence should increase further
the price potentialities of selected preferred issues of public utility
holding companies." 162
"As a result of the several forces discussed above, equity type
preferreds have advanced spectacularly over the last two or three
years. During the entire course of this market movement, it has
been typical of the equity preferred to sell at rather substantial
discounts from liquidating or distributable value, at least until
such time as liquidation, distribution of assets, or recapitalization
has actually taken place. Their sharper market movements have
159. More than sixty percent of these divestments took the form of portfolio distributions by holding companies to their own stockholders. Tenth Annual Report of
,the Securities and Exchange Commission (1945) 9o.
i6o. (1943) 15 STANDARD AND POOR'S OuTLoox, No. 39, P. 462.
16I. (194) 33 MOODY'S STOCK SURvKy, No. 13, p. 743.
162. (1944) 36 id., No. 37, p. ioi.
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often keyed in with steps (by the Company or the SEC) leading
toward compliance with the Act." 163
Still another has concluded that "Probably the greatest single factor [causing increased values in holding company securities] has been
completion of steps which bring corporate simplification plans nearer
consummation." 164
It is thus apparent that though Section ii is on occasions still
referred to as a "death sentence," the sophisticated observer no longer
regards even the directed reorganization or liquidation of a holding
company as a step to be feared by investors. There is increased recognition that these steps in the enforcement of the Act have been "akin
to a surgical operation, through which the dead skin (the top holding
company) was being cut away from the pores (the operating companies) in order to allow the latter to breathe." 165
The record of operation under Section i i to date speaks for itself.
The simplification process is going a long way toward giving the individual investor "the kind of security he thought he was buying in the
first place;" only the future can tell whether it will, as its sponsors
predicted, ultimately clear up "the tangle in which holding company
finance . . . left the industry and . . . reestablish a confident, stable

market for good utility securities."

166

163. (1945) 37 id., No. 29, p. 285.
164. (1944) 24 BARRON'S NATIONAL BUSINESS AND FINANCIAL WEEKLY, No. 44,
p. 2. See also (i944) i6 STANDARD AND POoW'S OUTLooK, No. 34, P. 575; (I943) I5
id., No. 12, p. 833.
i65. Cf. N. Y. Times, May 2, 1943, Section 5, p. 8, col. 7.
166. SEN. REP. No. 621, 74th Cong., ist Sess. (1935) I6.

